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The Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 contains favourable concessions applicable to 
taxpayers who derive income from the carrying on of farming operations. Taxpayers who 
carry on processes of manufacture may also expect favourable fiscal treatment, albeit to a 
lesser extent. The most relevant concessions applicable to the aforementioned distinct 
classes of taxpayers are discussed, and where applicable, reference is made to judicial 
commentaries and the literature as regards potential interpretational difficulties. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the first mentioned class of taxpayers above receive more 
extensive concessions with more favourable results than the latter. 
It is argued that the phrase 'farming operations' has been interpreted by the Courts and 
commentators to include, in certain circumstances, activities which go beyond the meaning 
ordinarily attributed to this phrase, such as the distribution of farming produce. Relevant 
cases are discussed and principles which have arisen therefrom are identified. 
Subsequently, cases are discussed which support the submission that the phrase 'farming 
operations' may include 'processes of manufacture' within its ambit, under certain 
circumstances. 
Ultimately, with the aid of a hypothetical scenario, it is submitted that taxpayers who can 
formulate a convincing argument for such widening of the scope of 'farming operations', 
so as to include their process of manufacture therein, may potentially apply the more 
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It is well known that the South African income tax regime offers favourable treatment for 
taxpayers carrying on certain types of activities. From the perspective of the fiscus, such 
favourable treatment may lead to a smaller intake of revenue, but in some instances public 
policy and economic considerations outweigh the concerns and a favourable taxation 
regime is justifiable. If one considers two of the most classic examples of favourable fiscal 
regimes, namely those pertaining to farming operations and manufacturing processes, 
certain public policy benefits may be identified. 
South Africa has a rich heritage as an agricultural producer. From the Cape's acclaimed 
wine farms dating back to the earliest settlers of the southern tip of Africa, to the 
cultivation of sugar cane in Kwazulu-Natal, farming in its various forms is a thriving and 
cardinal industry. Not only does the agricultural industry serve as one of the economic 
foundations of our country, it is an essential provider of employment and livelihood to 
many South Africans, contributing approximately 3.4% to South Africa's gross domestic 
product and employing about 9% of the country's workforce.} 
The manufacturing sector is similarly a very important industry for South Africa's 
economic wellbeing and future welfare, ranging from automotive assembly to the textile, 
food and chemical industries? The latest statistical data indicate that petroleum, chemical 
products, rubber and plastic products are the most significant contributors to the total 
income of the manufacturing industry. 3 The chemical industry alone contributes 
approximately 5% of South Africa's gross domestic product, and about 25% of the 
country's manufacturing sales.4 
In light of the above, it is evident that the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are crucial 
contributors to the South African economy. The benefits of favouring and promoting these 
industries are thus self-apparent. While there are many methods of doing so, one of the 
I 'South Africa' (Last update: 12 May 2009) Central Intelligence Agency - World Factbook, Available at 
https:/ /www .cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/SF .html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 'P3002 - Manufacturing Industry, 2005' (Published 5 October 2006) Statistics South Africa, Key findings 
available at http://www.statssa.gov.zaipublications/statskeyfmdings.asp?PPN=P3002&SCH=3760. 












most effective and direct methods of advancing an industry is through a preferential fiscal 
regime. The Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 ('the Act'i thus contains various provisions 
designed to act as incentives to taxpayers carrying on such operations. Farmers in 
particular are often referred to as a 'privileged class' due to the favourable fiscal treatment 
enjoyed by them. 
1.2. OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH 
This study firstly considers the distinctions between the fiscal treatment of taxpayers who 
either carry on farming operations or manufacturing processes. The relevant legislative 
provisions will be referred to and discussed, but only to the extent as required by the ambit 
of this study. 
The main focus is, however, on taxpayers who carry on the abovementioned activities 
simultaneously. As will be shown, such taxpayers may face anomalous and uncertain 
scenarios. A major potential problem for them is to identify what tax treatment should 
apply to their operations, and to what extent. Put differently, the question may arise as to 
what extent taxpayers' operations may more properly be described as farming operations 
(thus potentially qualifying for the tax treatment applicable to farmers), or as a process of 
manufacture, thus qualifying for the (generally) less favourable tax treatment applicable to 
such operations. 
The need for clarity in this regard becomes especially pressing when one of the potentially 
applicable tax regimes leads to more favourable results than the other. This study thus aims 
to investigate whether and to what extent such clarity may be obtained, and to consider the 
potential benefits to taxpayers. In order to achieve this goal, the methodology to be applied 
is the interpretational rules applicable to fiscal legislation as supported by judicial 
commentaries and clarification of extraneous issues from the literature. 
Instances will be considered where taxpayers' manufacturing processes were found to be 
unrelated to their farming operations, leading to judgments adverse to their claims. The 
study also considers those instances where taxpayers' manufacturing processes were found 
to be indivisible from or causally linked to their farming operations. The resulting 
5 This study takes into account all relevant tax legislative amendments up to and including the amendments 
brought about by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 60 of 2008. All references to 'section' and 












judgments were favourable to such taxpayers. The relevant factual circumstances will be 
closely examined in considering all of the cases referred to. 
While all of the judgments which are referred to were unquestionably dependent on the 
specific circumstances of each taxpayer at hand, it is submitted that various general 
principles may nonetheless be harvested from these sources. While not attempting to 
provide a universal solution or simple checklist, the ultimate goal of this study is thus to 
identify and discuss such general principles as may arise from the case law and 
commentaries referred to. 
To the extent that the necessary factual circumstances are in place, such general principles 
may ultimately be applied by taxpayers who carry on farming operations and 
manufacturing processes simultaneously. It is hoped that this, in turn, may assist taxpayers 
to obtain the most favourable fiscal treatment available to them, which is likely to have 











2. FARMING - LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Many South African farmers today face external factors which may present opportunities, 
but also pose serious challenges, including inter alia land distribution, black economic 
empowerment, restrictive labour policies and other economic issues.6 Such challenges may 
increase the costs to farmers of doing business, and may ultimately even affect their 
competitiveness, but fortunately there are many viable strategies and institutional 
innovations which may assist farmers in overcoming such challenges.7 This study proposes 
that a further important strategy to assist farmers in overcoming economic and other 
external challenges comes in the form of fiscal stimuli. This chapter aims to investigate the 
relevant provisions in the Act which favour farmers as a class. 
The initial focal point when considering the taxation regime applicable to farmers (or more 
accurately, taxpayers who carry on farming operations), is section 26,8 seeing as 'farming' 
is not specifically mentioned as a 'trade' in the definition of the latter term in section 1.9 
The heading of this section declares that it deals with the 'Determination of taxable income 
derived from farming'. Section 26(1) reads as follows: 
'(1) The taxable income of any person carrying on pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations 
shall, in so far as it is derived from such operations, be determined in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act but subject to the provisions of the First Schedule.' [Emphasis added.] 
Firstly, it appears from the above that the benefits of the First Schedulelo can only apply to 
a particular taxpayer if he derives income from 'pastoral, agricultural or other farming 
operations'. Losses are not mentioned specifically in section 26, but it is understood that 
the First Schedule may also be applicable, even if a loss arises from the 'pastoral, 
agricultural or other farming operations', instead of taxable income. II The scope of this 
6 G F Ortmann Promoting the competitiveness of SA Agriculture in a dynamic economic and political 
environment (2005), 291. 
Ibid. 297. 
8 Note that the ambit of this study does not extend to the fiscal concessions available specifically to 
agricultural co-operatives, as dealt with in sections 27 and 12C(I), seeing as they represent too narrow a class 
of taxpayer. 
9 M C J Bobbert Wat is die betekenis van boerdery vir Inkomstebelastingdoeleindes? (2001) 32. 
10 The most notable provision of the First Schedule for purposes of this study is the deductibility of so-called 
capital development expenditure in terms of paragraph 12(1). Refer to 2.3.2 below. 
11 A P De Koker Silke on South African Income Tax (2008) 15.4; and M Stiglingh et al Silke: Suid-Afrikaanse 
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study does not extend to a consideration of the tax consequences of losses arising from 
farming operations. 
Section 26(2), in turn, deals with persons who have ceased with 'carrying on pastoral, 
agricultural or other farming operations', and determines that the provisions of the Act 
(subject to certain paragraphs of the First Schedule) may continue to apply to such persons 
for a certain period. As will become clear, the ambit of this study is limited to taxpayers 
carrying on such operations and does not extend to those who have ceased to do so. 
Section 26(2) thus requires no further consideration for purposes of this study. 
Taxpayers to whom the provisions of section 26(1) apply are still in general subject to the 
provisions of the Act as a whole, but with the specific benefits and other provisions of the 
First Schedule applicable to them, where relevant. In this regard it has been noted that 
'income from farming operations is determined separately but is not taxed separately, and 
forms part of the taxpayer's overall taxable income.' 12 Therefore, in order to accurately 
determine what income is derived from 'pastoral, agricultural or farming operations', it is 
important that the terms used in section 26(1) be interpreted correctly. 
A number of key terms used in section 26(1) are not defined in the Act. Moreover, it is 
important to note that there are certain inconsistencies in the terminology of the Act, e.g. in 
some instances reference is made to taxpayers carrying on 'farming operations', but 
elsewhere simply to 'farmers,.13 There is thus a need for clarity as to the correct 
interpretation of the phrases used in section 26(1), and their relationship with the 
provisions of the rest of the Act. Fortunately, there are various instances of local and 
foreign case law and commentary where the terms used in section 26(1) of the Act (and 
similarly worded provisions in fiscal statutes of other jurisdictions) were considered. In 
what follows, the most relevant of these terms and phrases are considered individually. 
In particular, it will be shown that the phrases 'carrying on', 'pastoral' and 'agricultural', 
'other farming operations' and 'income derived from such operations' have given rise to 
some difficulties in interpretation. The aim of the following sections (2.2.1 - 2.2.4) is to 
address these interpretational issues with reference to case law and commentary. 
12 R C Williams Income Tax in South Africa - Law and Practice (2006) 738, with reference to ITC 926 
24 SATC 254 at 258. 
13 Ibid, 738; for instance, the phrase 'farmer' is used in the preamble to paragraph 12(1) of the First Schedule, 











2.2. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 26 
2.2.1. 'CARRYING ON' 
The phrase 'carrying on' has not been defmed in the Act, but may be described in general 
tenns as to 'continue an activity or task.,14 This particular phrase, while seemingly 
straightforward in meaning, has been the subject of much judicial consideration. It has 
been noted that while generalisations are perilous, certain general guidelines may 
nonetheless be set out against which economic activities may be tested to detennine 
whether they qualify as 'pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations' .15 The latter 
tenn is one of the focus areas of this study. 
A protracted debate in judicial precedents flowed from the above requirement for a factual 
review of the taxpayer's circumstances. This debate basically involved two distinct schools 
of thought. On the one hand, there was the view that the factual criterion is entirely 
subjective, i.e. an enquiry was required into whether the taxpayer intended in good faith to 
engage in farming operations. An example of a preference for this subjective enquiry is 
ITC 1424,16 where the taxpayer's loss-making farming activities were regarded by the 
revenue authorities to be a mere 'hobby' and thus not qualifying for the favourable fiscal 
dispensation for farmers, whereas the Court found otherwise. While the Court agreed that 
farming concessions should not apply to taxpayers who 'indulge in certain country pursuits 
merely as an interest, or to give themselves a more enjoyable way of life,' 17 (i.e. so-called 
'hobby farmers'),t8 it found on the facts that this description did not apply to the taxpayer. 
Instead, the Court found that the taxpayer was 'travelling hopefully' in carrying on his 
unsuccessful farming operations, that this hope was based on a reasonable foundation, and 
that the taxpayer's operations did indeed constitute the carrying on of a trade as a farmer. 19 
The opposing view in the abovementioned debate was that an objective element is also 
required (i.e. that, coupled with the subjective element, the external factors must indicate 
that the taxpayer's activities constitute farming operations). In this regard it has been held 
that the question of whether or not a person may be regarded as carrying on 'pastoral, 
14 C Soanes & A Stevenson The Oxford Dictionary of English (2005), 265. 
IS Bobbert (note 9 above) 34. 
16 (1986) 49 SATC 99 (Z). This was a decision by the Zimbabwe Special Court, and thus not binding in 
South African law, but it is submitted that it may still be relevant for guidance purposes as it dealt with 
similarly worded legislative provisions. 
17 Ibid, 104. 
18 Williams (note 12 above) 744. 











agricultural or other farming operations' is one of fact determined with reference to the 
circumstances of the particular case.20 In other words, careful consideration must be given 
in each particular case to the factual circumstances of a taxpayer in order to decide whether 
section 26 will apply to his / her activities.21 
In a decision effectively ending the above debate as to which approach is correct, that of 
C:SARS v Smith, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the test as to whether a taxpayer is 
carrying on farming operations in terms of section 26 is an entirely subjective one.22 It was 
held further that section 26(1) does not provide any discernible reason for introducing 'a 
reasonable prospect of profit' as a separate requirement to the taxpayer's genuine intention 
to make a profit. 23 In conclusion it was held that a taxpayer who wishes to rely on section 
26(1) must show proof that he is engaged in an activity in the nature of farming, and that 
he 'possesses at the relevant time a genuine intention to carry on farming operations 
profitably.,24 Such a taxpayer will thus have established that he is indeed engaged in 
farming operations and may have access to the relevant favourable legislative provisions, 
whereas the converse will apply if he fails to meet the tests in Smith's case.25 
Importantly, it must be noted that Smith's case does not completely do away with the query 
as to whether a taxpayer's farming operations had an objectively reasonable prospect of 
profitability. This question remains relevant, but only in so far as it sheds light on the 
credibility of the taxpayer's claimed intention of carrying on farming operations 
profitably.26 The legislative position as it stands after Smith's watershed case has been 
usefully summarised as follows: 
'Accordingly a taxpayer who relies on s26( 1) is (over and above proof that he is engaged in an activity 
in the nature of fanning) only required to show that he possesses at the relevant time a genuine 
intention to carry on farming operations profitably and all considerations which bear on that question 
including the prospect of making a profit will contribute to the answer, none of itself being decisive. ,27 
20 ITC 1319 42 SATC 263 (EC) 264; ITC 1414 48 SATC 174 (T) 178. 
21 lbid,263. 
22 C:SARS v Smith 2002 (6) SA 621 (SCA), 65 SATC 6; L Olivier Law of Taxation (2003) 921 and Williams 
Law and Practice (note 12 above) 741. 
23 Ibid, 13. 
24 Ibid. 
2S Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 742. 
26 R C Williams Income Tax in South Africa - Cases and Materials (2005) 551, with reference to C:SARS v 
Smith (note 22 above). 
27 R Stretch & J Silke SCA Rules on meaning of 'farming operations' and jettisons the 'reasonable prospect 











In reaction to the abovementioned decision in Smith's case,28 the legislature enacted 
section 20A, which ring-fences the losses arising from certain 'suspect trades' (Le. certain 
trades which do not have a reasonable prospect of turning a profit within a reasonable 
time). 'Farming or animal breeding' which is not carried on on a full-time basis, is 
specifically included as a 'suspect trade'.29 Williams notes that losses incurred by a 
taxpayer in carrying on farming operations (Le. having passed the subjective test laid down 
in Smith's case) may be subject to the provisions of section 20A, but emphasises that this 
section has not nullified the decision in Smith's case.30 While the aforementioned 
comments are relevant for background purposes, section 20A falls outside of the ambit of 
this study and will not be considered in further detail. This is due to the fact that section 
20A deals specifically with assessed losses, whereas the focus of this study is rather on 
taxable income earned from farming operations and manufacturing processes, and the 
applicable fiscal concessions available in those respects. 
It has further been held that it is not a prerequisite that operations be carried on on an 
extensive area or scale to be recognised as farming operations,3] and also that a person may 
carry on various trades with 'farming' being merely one ofthem.32 Ultimately, though, the 
question as to whether a taxpayer's activities constitute the carrying on of farming 
operations is a question of fact.33 Considerations such as the area or scale of a taxpayer's 
operations, or other trades carried on by him, are merely further considerations which bear 
on the question as to whether the taxpayer genuinely intends to carry on farming 
operations. 
2.2.2. 'PASTORAL' AND 'AGRICULTURAL' 
The terms 'pastoral' and 'agricultural' are of a specific character, whereas the subsequent 
phrase in section 26(1), 'or other farming operations' (discussed in 2.2.3), is of a general 
nature. The terms 'pastoral' and 'agricultural' are not defined in the Act, and regard may 
thus be had, as a starting point, to general dictionary definitions. The term 'pastoral' may 
28 Olivier (note 22 above) 921. 
29 Section 20A(2)(bXvi). 
30 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 742. 
31 R C Williams The Law of South Africa 534, with reference to fTC 208 6 SATC 55, fTC 93724 SATC 374. 
32 Ibid, with reference to fTC 639 15 SATC 226; Williams Cases and Materials (note 26 above) 535, and 
Buglers Post (Pty) Ltd v SfR (note 74 below). 











be defined as '(land) used for the keeping or grazing of sheep or cattle.'34 The word 
'agriculture', of which the adjective 'agricultural' is derived, may in turn be defined as 'the 
science or practice of farming, including cultivation of the soil for the growing of crops 
and the rearing of animals to provide food, wool, and other products. ,35 The interaction 
between the former specific terms and the latter general phrase, as well as the relevant 
principle of statutory interpretation, will be considered in greater detail below. 
The Afrikaans translation of the abovementioned terms perhaps provides further clarity as 
to their intended meaning, namely 'veeboerdery' (which may be loosely translated as 
'livestock farming', in the case of 'pastoral' operations), as opposed to 'landbou' (which is 
accurately translated as 'agriculture' in section 26(1)). 
In considering the meaning of the terms 'pastoral' and 'agricultural' in a Zimbabwean 
income tax provision similarly worded to section 26(1), the Court noted that such activities 
normally constitute the production of stock and produce from a land-based economy. 36 
It is submitted that income derived by a taxpayer from the carrying on of operations which 
are manifestly of a 'pastoral' or 'agricultural' nature, i.e. involving the production of 
livestock or produce from a land-based economy, should be subject to the provisions of 
section 26(1) (and, by implication, the provisions of the First Schedule). In addition, in 
applying the subjective approach favoured by the Supreme Court of Appeal,37 a taxpayer 
who carries on the abovementioned operations without a reasonable prospect of profit may 
nonetheless be able to rely on the provisions of section 26. 
The discussion below considers the meaning of the phrase 'other farming operations' . 
2.2.3. 'OTHER FARMING OPERATIONS' 
The following lucid dicta from ITC 1373 deserve to be quoted in full, where it was held 
that by using the words 'other farming activities' in a similar legislative context,38 
, . .. the legislature intended to widen the ambit of activities that were included ... beyond those that 
were strictly pastoral or agricultural. If the intention had been to limit the scope of the relief to those 
34 The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 1287. 
3S Ibid, 32. 
36ITC J 37345 SATe 189 (Z) 194, and refer to note 38 below. 
37 C:SARSv Smith (note 22 above). 
38 As mentioned above, this case was based on the Zimbabwean income tax legislation, which contained, in 
its defmition of a 'farmer', taxpayers who derive income from 'pastoral, agricultural or other farming 
activities', which phrase is identical to that contained in section 26( 1), save for the substitution of the word 











taxpayers whose activities fell only within the ambit of those words, there would have been no need 
for the next phrase because those two explicit categories would have exhaustively described all the 
recipients of the fiscal policy assistance to farmers.' 39 
The President of the Court, Squires J, then went on to juxtapose the above remarks with the 
following comments: 
'On the other hand ... the general words 'other farming activities' take their colour and tenor from the 
preceding particular words, and the activities thereby contemplated must be activities that are farming 
in the same sense that pastoral and agricultural activities are farming ... the legislature must have 
intended to so narrow the scope of activities that otherwise would be included in the word 'farming', 
because without such limitation it could arguably include a variety of other pursuits that are not 
concerned with the primary production of stock and produce from a land-based economy, but which 
could be called farming. ,40 
In the abovementioned case, the Court found that the raising of thoroughbred horses by a 
taxpayer fell within the ambit of the general phrase 'other farming activity', alternatively 
that this was a 'pastoral' activity as it involved the care of a herd. The income derived by 
the taxpayer in this case from these activities was thus found to qualify for the applicable 
relief offered to farmers.41 
The above approach of the Court is consistent with the canon of interpretation referred to 
as the ejusdem generis rule (meaning 'of the same kind'), which holds that' ... a general 
provision is to be read subject to special provisions in the same document. ,42 The 
following description of the application of the ejusdem generis rule is especially relevant 
for present purposes, and is borne out by the approach of the Court referred to above: 
'Where words (which) have a particular meaning or limited meaning, are followed by a phrase of 
general application, the meaning of the said general phrase is restricted to the generic meaning of the 
preceding words. ,43 
It is thus submitted that the phrase 'or other farming operations', when preceded (as in 
section 26(1» by the words 'pastoral' and 'agricultural', indicates 'the use ofland either 
for growing marketable crops or for using the products of the land for the rearing or 
feeding of animals and other stock. ,44 However, it may rightly be said that modem 
39 ITC 1373 (note 36 above) 193. 
40 Ibid, 194. 
41 Ibid, 196. 
42 E A Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation - Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 147, with reference 
to Van den Berg 3 c 98 225; Utrechtse Consultatien 1 c 23 n8. 
43 Ibid, 148, with reference to Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 154. 











production methods preclude such a limited meaning of 'other farming operations' .45 One 
may, for instance, consider the production of eggs by using the battery system, where 
chickens are fed by mechanical means and do not 'live off the land', or dairy farming, 
where most of the fodder may be purchased by the owner instead of grown on his own 
land. These examples have been held to constitute 'farming operations,'46 even though they 
indicate a wider ambit than the preceding words to 'other farming operations' may 
indicate. 
In light of the considerations above, it is submitted that the phrase 'carrying on pastoral, 
agricultural or other farming operations' in section 26(1) may include a wide range of 
'farming' activities. However, it should be noted that this range of activities is not so wide 
as to include activities which are manifestly not farming operations, such as speculation 
with livestock, for example. It has been held that a speculator in livestock 'is really 
concerned with the marketing of animals, he does not usually retain those animals for a 
long time ... (and) does not do anything to improve the quality of those animals,'47 
whereas a farmer's operations are essentially different to speculation, namely 'to acquire a 
particular asset, to work on that asset and through farming methods to realise it at a 
profit.'48 It appears further that the South African Revenue Service ('SARS') also regards 
livestock speculation as a business distinct from farming operations.49 
It is thus submitted that care should be taken in seeking to argue that the activities of a 
taxpayer constitute 'pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations'. The first two terms 
are specific and have a clearer meaning, while the latter phrase has a wider ambit and is 
more open to interpretation. As noted above, the phrase 'other farming operations' must 
thus be construed in light of the specific preceding terms. 
The taxable income of a person who carries on operations which fit into the ambit of either 
'pastoral', 'agricultural' or 'other farming operations', and who possesses a genuine 
intention to carry on such operations, should thus qualify for the treatment envisaged in 
section 26(1), provided that his income is 'derived from such operations.' This latter 
relevant phrase of section 26(1) is considered in more detail below. 
45 Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 20.5. 
46 Ibid, citing Reid v IRC (1947) 28 TC 451. 
47 ITC 58614 SATC 123 (U) 125. 
48 Ibid. 











2.2.4. 'INCOME DERIVED FROM SUCH OPERATIONS' 
This phrase indicates the requirement of a causal connection between income and the 
'pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations' of a taxpayer in order for such income 
to be 'derived from' such operations. It is understood that the word 'derived' should be 
treated as synonymous with the words 'arising' or 'accruing', thus implying a direct causal 
connection. 50 
In this regard, the Appellate Division (as it then was), in the case of D&N Promotions, 51 
agreed with the following dicta from ITC 1319,52 namely that: 
, ... the income and the source from which the income arises, namely farming operations, which of 
course embraces numerous agricultural activities, must be directly connected. An indirect or remote 
one will not suffice.' 
The Appellate decision in D&N Promotions upheld the judgment of the court a quo 
(delivered by the Natal Special Court in ITC 1505),53 in a clear example of the application 
of the latter principle requiring a direct connection between income and farming 
operations. In the court a quo it was found that interest accruing to the appellant (a sugar 
cane grower) formed part of the compensation for the product produced by him in the 
course of his farming operations, and thus fell to be dealt with in terms of section 26( 1) and 
the provisions of the First Schedule. 54 However, a further amount of interest from invested 
surplus funds, due to the appellant, was found by the Court not to be derived from farming 
operations. 55 
It is further not enough to simply show that the income was derived from the produce of 
the land in question; it must be the result of a farming operation - for example, rental 
income from the leasing of farming land is not derived from farming operations but rather 
from the ownership of the land. 56 
On the other hand, where a taxpayer leases his farmland to another in return for a share of 
the produce from the land, or a share of the proceeds of such produce (a so-called 
so De Koker Silke (note 11 above) 15.32, quoted with approval in ITC 1505 (note 53 below) 415. 
51 CIR V D&N Promotions (note 33 above) 183. 
52 Note 20 above. 
53 ITC 1505 53 SATe 406 (N). 
54 Ibid, 416. 
55 Ibid, 418. 
56 The Law of South Africa (note 31 above) 534, with reference to ITC 1665 SATe 85; ITC 732 18 SATe 











'partiarian' lease),57 then the necessary direct connection between such consideration and 
the farming operations should be established, and the consideration will be 'income from 
farming operations. ,58 
These examples emphasise the importance of the factual circumstances of the taxpayer, to 
determine whether income earned by him is 'derived from pastoral, agricultural or other 
farming operations' in terms of section 26(1). Put differently, this is a question of fact and 
not one of law, and it arises because of the requirements laid down by section 26(1) and the 
First Schedule, which must be satisfied before the benefits of the relevant provisions may 
be available to a taxpayer. 59 
In addition to the comments above, section 17 A deserves brief mention. This section 
allows the deduction of expenditure incurred on soil erosion works from the income 
derived by a taxpayer (the lessor) from letting land on which bona fide pastoral, 
agricultural or other farming operations were carried on (as long as the lessor can produce 
a specified certificate). 60 Thus, while such rental income derived by the lessor will simply 
form part of his taxable income, the lessor may benefit from the deduction allowed in 
section 17 A of expenditure which is arguably of a capital nature, and would thus not 
ordinarily be allowed as a deduction under the general deduction formula. 61 
As pointed out above, however, the rental income referred to in section 17 A is not income 
derived from 'the carrying on of pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations' of the 
lessor, as it is the lessee who is farming. While the deduction of expenditure on soil erosion 
works incurred by the lessor may thus be allowed in terms of section 17 A, the rental 
income itself falls outside the ambit of section 26( 1) and the First Schedule. Accordingly, 
section 17 A bears no further consideration within the ambit of this study. 
From the point of view of the lessee it should be noted, however, that income earned by 
him from the use of farmland may still constitute 'income derived from farming 
operations,' if the relevant factual circumstances are present. In this regard it has been held 
that a taxpayer need not be the owner of farmland in order to derive income from it - he 
57 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 739 regarding partiarian leases; with reference to Oosthuizen v 
Estate Oosthuizen 1903 TS 688 at 692; Blumberg & Sulski v Brown and Freitas 1922 TPD 130. 
58 ITC 166 5 SATC 85, 86 - 87; ITC 1630 60 SATC 59, 62; Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 739. 
S9 R Stretch & J Silke Farming Operations - Consideration Received for Hire of a Farm (September 1999), 
with reference to ITC 1630 (note 58 above). 
60 Section 17 A(1 ). 











must merely have a right to the land and its produce.62 This should be the case for a lessee 
who has the right to use farmland and the produce which it brings forth. 
2.3. THE FIRST SCHEDULE 
2.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned above, section 26 determines that the First Schedule applies in computing 
the taxable income derived by a taxpayer from 'carrying on pastoral, agricultural or other 
farming operations. ,63 Nonetheless, certain tax benefits available to taxpayers who carry on 
such operations are found outside of the First Schedule, for instance in section 12B(1 )(f), 
which allows such taxpayers a deduction in respect of inter alia machinery.64 
Other sections specifically exclude 'farming' from their ambit, for instance section 
12C(1)(a) and (b)65 and section 22(1), which deals with trading stock. Such exclusions are 
not without reason, however, and are crucial for the operation of the First Schedule. Were 
it not for the specific exclusion of 'farming' from the ambit of section 22, for example, a 
farmer's livestock and produce would also have been 'trading stock' for purposes of that 
section.66 The reason for this exclusion is that the First Schedule contains specific 
provisions regarding the determination and treatment of the value of livestock and produce. 
Accordingly, a brief overview of the paragraphs of the First Schedule is set out below. 
Paragraph 1 clarifies the frequent references to 'year of assessment' in the Schedule and 
allows varying periods of assessment in certain circumstances. In general, paragraphs 2 - 8 
deal with the determination and treatment of the value of livestock in various 
circumstances, including the ring-fencing of losses arising therefrom. Paragraph 9 deals 
with the valuation of produce and paragraph 11 deals with recoupments in respect of 
livestock or produce in various instances. The provisions of paragraph 12 will be dealt with 
in detail below. 
Paragraph 13 contains a special concession applicable to farmers who are forced to sell and 
replace (within specified periods) livestock due to inter alia drought or so-called livestock 
reduction schemes organised by the Government. Paragraph 13A applies to farmers who 
62 fTC 1548 55 SATC 26 (C) 29. 
63 Section 26(1 ). 
64 Refer to the brief discussion of this section in 2.3.2 below. 
6S Section 12C is discussed in more detail under 3.2 below. 











are forced to dispose of livestock on account of drought and who deposit the resulting 
proceeds with the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa. 
Paragraphs 14 - 16 contain special provisions applicable to plantation farmers, and 
paragraph 17 deals with sugar cane farmers whose crops are damaged by fire. Paragraph 
19 determines that certain categories of farmers may· elect to be taxed on their average 
farming income, in accordance with section 5(10). 
Finally, paragraph 20 provides a special tax concession for farmers who cease their 
farming operations due to the acquisition of their income-producing farmland inter alia by 
the State, and who receive certain specified 'abnormal farming receipts or accruals'. 
There are various intricacies in applying the abovementioned paragraphs, none of which 
(aside from paragraph 12) fall within the ambit of this study. The broad overview above is 
largely for background purposes, but also to emphasise the point made by the Appellate 
Division that 'farmers are, as a class, placed in a favourable position. ,67 Even though this 
comment was made with reference to an earlier (but similar) version of paragraph 12,68 it is 
submitted that it accurately describes the fiscal treatment of taxpayers who derive income 
from farming operations as envisaged by section 26 and the First Schedule. 
2.3.2. PARAGRAPH 12-GENERAL 
As noted above (at 2.1), taxpayers who carry on farming operations are also entitled to the 
deduction of expenses from taxable income in terms of the general deduction formula, 69 as 
section 26(1) subjects such taxpayers to the general provisions of the Act. Examples of 
deductible expenses which may be particular to farmers, but nonetheless deductible under 
the general deduction formula, include the purchase price of livestock, animal feed and 
fertilizer.70 Farmers may also be entitled to the specific deductions allowed to other 
taxpayers in section 11 (for example repairs and maintenance in section II(d)). 
Paragraph 12, however, contains certain specific provisions which are solely aimed at 
'farmers' (Le. persons who carry on 'pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations' and 
derive income from such operations, as envisaged by section 26(1)). Most notably, 
paragraph 12(1)(a) - (i) lists a number of items of expenditure which are of a capital 
67 Ernst v CIR [1954] 1 All SA 340 (A) 343. 
68 Paragraph 17 of the Third Schedule of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941 (repealed). 
69 Note 61 above. 











nature, but may nonetheless be deductible by a farmer from his / her taxable income. It is 
apparent that this concession runs against the grain of the Act to an extent, as it generally 
does not allow the deduction of expenses of a capital nature from taxable income.71 As will 
be discussed further below, this concession clearly places farmers in a privileged class.72 
The types of expenses in paragraph 12(1)(c) - (i) are commonly referred to as 'capital 
development expenditure.'73 The remarks of the Appellate Division in Buglers Post 74 
regarding the legislative intention behind the concessions granted in section 26 and 
paragraph 12 of the First Schedule are perhaps a useful starting point in this regard. In the 
words of Rumpff ACJ: 
'Having regard to s 26 of the Act and para 12 of Schedule I, it seems clear that the intention of the 
legislature was to encourage a farmer to improve his farm so as to increase its productivity and to 
allow a farmer the deduction of expenses incurred in the improvement of his farm, such expenses to 
include the costs of certain capital works erected on his farm.' 75 
These comments were echoed by the Zimbabwe Special Court, which remarked that the 
concessions to farmers - especially the deduction of capital expenditure - were intended to 
'give incentives to persons engaged in the trade of primary production as farmers to effect 
substantial improvements to land occupied by them. ,76 
Moreover, the Appellate Division in Buglers Post agreed with the remark in Ernst v CIR77 
that these concessions place farmers in a favourable position, and that there is no 
justification in the legislation for extending the exception (namely that farmers may deduct 
capital expenditure in terms of the relevant paragraph).78 Accordingly, the types of 
expenditure listed in paragraph 12(1) must be strictly construed, based on the rule of 
interpretation that the Court has a duty to reject any extension of a class privilege of 
exemption from taxation.79 
71 R Stretch & J Silke SCA grapples with the true nature of an assessment (July 1998), with reference to 
Odendaal v KBI (note 73 below). 
72 De Koker Silke (note 11 above) 15.30. 
73 Odendaal v KBI (1998) 2 All SA 461 (A) 464; Stiglingh Silke (note 11 above) 601; Williams Law and 
Practice (note 12 above) 755. 
74 Buglers Post (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1974 (3) SA 28 (A), 36 SATe 71. 
75 Ibid, 75. 
76 ITC 1424 (note 16 above) 104. 
77 Note 67 above, 343. 
78 Buglers Post (note 74 above) 76. 











It has further been noted that it is only where 'a genuine business of farming ... is carried 
on' that the expenditure referred to in paragraph 12 may be admitted for deduction,80 
which provides evidence of the abovementioned 'strict interpretation' in the practice of the 
fisc. It is nonetheless submitted that the legislative intention (referred to above) with this 
concession provides. ample justification for the class privilege bestowed on farmers, and 
adherence to the strict interpretation of these provisions should not cause one to lose sight 
of that intention. 
Before the individual provisions of paragraph 12(1) are considered in more detail, a 
number of general requirements are apposite. For expenditure envisaged in paragraph 
12(1) to be deductible by a farmer, it must be incurred by him personally,81 and must be in 
connection with his own farming operations.82 However, paragraph 12 does not require 
that a farmer must be the owner of the farmland in respect of which expenditure envisaged 
in paragraph 12(1) was incurred, as a prerequisite for deductibility.83 
An overview of the various items of expenditure which are deductible In terms of 
paragraph 12(1) (read with paragraph 12(3», reveals that most of them are limited in that 
although they are fully deductible, it is only to the extent that there is taxable farming 
income. Expenditure of the kind envisaged in item (a) (the eradication of noxious plants 
and alien invasive vegetation) and item (b) (the prevention of soil erosion) are the 
exceptions, seeing as they are deductible in full in the year of assessment in which they 
were incurred,84 and can be set off against farming or non-farming income, even if that 
results in an assessed loss.85 The favourable treatment in respect of the aforementioned 
expenditure is particularly laudable, as alien vegetation, invasive plants and soil erosion 
pose considerable threats to South Africa's biological diversity, depleting water resources 
and damaging arable land.86 This is an indication that the legislature uses fiscal policy as a 
valuable tool in advancing the agricultural industry, while simultaneously seeking to 
promote nature conservation. 
80 R H Zulman Income Tax Practice Manual (September 2008) A:FII. 
81 De Koker Silke (note 11 above) 15.30, with reference to ITC 2807 SATe 251. 
82 Ernst v CIR (note 67 above) 342 - 343. 
83 Stiglingh Silke (note 11 above) 601. 
84 Zulman (note 80 above) A:FII, with reference to Odendaal v KBI (note 73 above). 
85 The Law of South Africa (note 31 above) 553. 











On the other hand, the types of expenditure envisaged under items (c) to (i) are 'ring~ 
fenced' so as to prevent the abuse of the concessions.87 These provisions briefly include 
expenditure in respect of dipping tanks, irrigation, fences, buildings, certain planting 
activities, roads and bridges and electricity.88 Expenditure on these items can thus only be 
deducted from taxable income derived. from farming operations.89 Any excess of such 
deductions may be carried forward and set off against taxable income from farming in 
succeeding years of assessment, as long as the taxpayer continues to carry on farming 
operations.9o In addition, the amount carried forward may be reduced in a succeeding year 
of assessment by recoupments in respect of movable assets arising in that year, if certain 
circumstances are present.91 
A highly significant type of expenditure for purposes of this study, namely that in respect 
of buildings used in connection with farming operations,92 is discussed in 2.3.3 below. 
A further provision of considerable significance was previously contained in paragraph 
12(1),93 namely an outright deduction of the purchase price of inter alia machinery and 
other articles used by a farmer for farming purposes.94 This outright deduction has been 
removed from the First Schedule, however, and replaced by a so~called 'phased' deduction 
or depreciation allowance in terms of section 12B(1)(I),95 which allows a 50:30:20 
deduction over three years of the cost of any machinery, implement, utensil or article 
(other than livestock).96 It is further required that such an asset must be 'brought into use 
for the first time by that taxpayer and used by him or her in the carrying on of his or her 
farming operations, ,97 (emphasis added). It is submitted that the emphasised phrase is a 
welcome instance of consistency in the Act, seeing as the wording echoes that of 
section 26(1). This consistency is especially helpful, seeing as there is a considerable body 
of case law and commentary which deals with the interpretation of the wording of the latter 
section, as discussed in 2.2 above. It is submitted that the aforementioned authorities may 
thus also be relied upon in interpreting the provisions of section 12B(1 )(1). 
87 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 756. 
88 Paragraph 12(1)(c) ~ (l). 
89 Paragraph 12(3). 
90 Paragraph 12(3); The Law of South Africa (note 31 above) 553. 
91 Paragraph 12(3B); The Law of South Africa (Ibid). 
92 Paragraph 12(1)(/). 
93 Namely item (j), which was repealed by section 45(a) of the Income Tax Act No. 113 of 1993. 
94 The Law of South Africa (note 31 above) 552. 
95 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 755. 
96 In other words, a deduction of 50% of the cost to the taxpayer of the asset in the first year of its use, 30% 
in the second year and 20% in the third. 











2.3.3. PARAGRAPH 12(1)(f} 
The remaining provision contained in paragraph 12(1), namely item (f), provides for the 
deduction of expenditure incurred in respect of 'the erection of, or extensions, additions or 
improvements (other than repairs) to, buildings used in connection with farming 
operations, other than those used for domestic purposes.' Seeing as the capital assets 
envisaged in this item often represent significant costs to taxpayers (and are likely amongst 
their most valuable assets), the prospect of a 100% deduction of expenditure incurred in 
respect thereof, is highly advantageous. Before considering an alarming recent legislative 
amendment hereto, the meaning of the most relevant wording of paragraph 12(1)(f} is 
briefly considered. 
Firstly, it is submitted that the phrase 'erection of, or extensions, additions or 
improvements (other than repairs) to ... ' is of sufficient clarity and identifiable scope so as 
to accurately describe which types of activities in relation to 'buildings' may give rise to 
deductible expenditure in terms of paragraph 12(1)(f}. By contrast, the meaning of the 
word 'building' in the context of paragraph 12(1 )(f), although apparently straightforward, 
has been the subject of considerable scrutiny. It has been held, for example, that 'a building 
is a substantial structure, more or less of a permanent nature, consisting of walls, a roof, 
and the necessary appurtenances thereto.'98 It has been noted further that the word 
'building' 'is not used in a technical sense' in this context, and 'the question of what 
appurtenances form part of a building for the purposes of para 12(1)(f} is a question of 
fact.'99 In light of the aforegoing, it is submitted that a farmer seeking to claim an 
allowance under paragraph 12(1)(f} should ensure that his / her factual circumstances 
clearly justify the description of the particular structure as a 'building' or an 'appurtenance 
thereto'. 
Next, the interpretation of the expression 'in connection with' deserves brief mention. As 
for this phrase generally, which appears frequently in the Act,100 it has been held to have 'a 
wide and comprehensive meaning, but not so wide or comprehensive as to embrace a 
98 De Koker, Si/lce (note 11 above) 15.34, with reference to the majority decision in CIR v Le Sueur 1960 (2) 
SA 709 (A), 23 SATe 261. 
99 Ibid, 15.34. 
100 The phrase 'in connection with' appears, for example, in paragraph (g)(ii) of the 'gross income' definition 
in section 1; section 4(1); section 8(1)(d); section 9(1XbA); section 9D(10)(aXiv)(bb); section 110(13); 











remote and indirect connection,' that it envisages 'a direct connection ... subservient and 
ancillary to the particular business,' and that 'the true position is that while the closest and 
most intimate relationship is not necessary, it is not enough to show merely a loose and 
remote one.' 101 
The importance of the word 'used' which precedes the phrase 'in connection with' was 
also emphasised by the Court in the case referred to above, noting that 'while the buildings 
might be useful or desirable or even necessary from the taxpayer's point of view, (it) will 
not justify the deduction of their cost, if, in fact, the buildings are not used in, or in 
connection with, farming operations.'102 Finally, in fmding against the taxpayer, the Court 
held that it was not sufficient for the taxpayer to show that there was simply 'any use at all 
in connection with farming operations', but rather that 'the predominant use of the 
buildings was in connection with farming operations ... (and) it would not suffice if such 
use was merely ancillary or subordinate to the use of the buildings for (other) purposes.' 103 
As the meaning of the subsequent phrase, 'farming operations', has already been 
considered in a similar context (2.2.3 above), the last remaining portion of 
paragraph 12(1)(f) discussed below is the specific exclusion set out in the phrase 'other 
than those (buildings) used for domestic purposes.' 
While paragraph 12(1)(f) still provides for a very favourable concession to farmers, it must 
be noted that a recent amendment104 thereto considerably narrows the range of possible 
deductions allowed in terms thereof. The legislature effected this startling amendment by 
removing the emphasised words in the following portion of paragraph 12(1)(f): 
, ... buildings used in connection with farming operations, other than those used for [the] 
domestic purposes [ofpenons who are not employees of such farmer].' 105 
The result of t is amendment is that, with effect from 21 October 2008, farmers are no 
longer entitled to a preferential deduction under paragraph 12(1 )(f) for expenditure 
incurred by them in respect of housing for their employees. 106 Prior to this amendment, the 
101 Per Herbstein J in ITC 885 23 SATe 336 (C) 338, quoting his own remarks from Income Tax Appeal No. 
5647 (not reported), after a consideration of relevant English authorities and case law. 
102 ITC 885 (note 101 above) 338 - 339. This case dealt with the application of a similarly worded provision 
in an earlier incarnation of the Act (note 68 above), where the taxpayer claimed a capital allowance in respect 
of the costs of erection of buildings comprising a 'health centre' on its farm. The dispute revolved around 
whether the buildings were used in connection with the taxpayer's farming operations. 
103 Ibid, 340. 
104 In terms of section 57 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 60 of2008. 
105 Ibid, section 57(l)(b) read with section 57(2). 











effect of paragraph 12(1)(1) was to entitle farmers to claim 'up to a maximum ofR15,OOO 
for anyone employee irrespective of the number of buildings erected, extended, added to 
or improved.'107 Even though the deduction previously allowed to farmers in this regard 
was thus limited, it was nonetheless a favourable incentive which provided farmers with 
excellent motivation to provide housing of good quality to their employees. lOS 
Farmers who seek a similar deduction in future must now have recourse to the relevant 
provisions which are applicable to taxpayers in general, but which are not as favourable, 
i.e. those contained under section 13sex.109 It remains to be seen what the legislative 
intention was with this far-reaching amendment, as no official explanation has been 
provided as of yet,IIO nor has any comment been forthcoming from the agricultural 
industry thus far .111 
2.4. CONCLUSION - FARMING OPERATIONS 
This chapter set out to identify the legislative provisions pertaining to taxpayers who 
derive income from farming operations, as relevant for purposes of this study. The most 
important principles which have arisen during the course of this discussion are, in brief, the 
following. 
Taxpayers who carry on farming operations (whether it be in the form of 'pastoral', 
'agricultural', or 'other farming operations'), may qualify for favourable fiscal treatment 
under the Act. Section 26(1) determines that the taxable income derived by a taxpayer who 
carries on such operations will be dealt with in terms of the Act in general, but will also 
qualify for the favourable concessions and other provisions of the First Schedule. It is thus 
important to determine, fir tly, whether a taxpayer is indeed 'carrying on' such operations, 
and it has been held that the test in this regard is entirely subjective - i.e. whether the 
taxpayer intended to carry on farming operations. Regard may nonetheless be had to 
107 De Koker, Silke (note 11 above), 15.34. 
108 Wilson (note 106 above) 3. 
109 Wilson (note 106 above) 3. Such a farmer would then have to comply with the various requirements of 
section 13sex, which allows for a deduction of 5% of the acquisition cost to a taxpayer of new and unused 
residential units (or improvements thereto) - inter alia he must own at least five residential units that are used 
solely for the purposes of his trade. 
HO The Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill (2008), at 71, refers only to the 
rationale for the insertion of items (IA) and (ID) into paragraph 12, both of which deal with expenditure 
incurred in relation to the conservation or maintenance of farmland. No mention is made of the reasoning 
behind the amendment to paragraph 12(1)(j). 











additional factors (such as a reasonable prospect of profit), but only for purposes of 
confirming the taxpayer's claimed intention. 
As for the meaning of the terms 'pastoral' and 'agricultural' in section 26( 1), these terms 
are of a specific nature, and include, generally, the production of stock and produce from a 
land-based economy. The subsequent phrase in that section, 'other farming operations', in 
contrast, is of a general nature. While the latter phrase does have a wide ambit, it must be 
construed in light of the preceding specific terms. The subsequent requirement in section 
26(1), that taxable income must be 'derived from' the abovementioned farming operations, 
indicates principally that a direct causal connection is required between the taxpayer's 
farming operations and the resultant income. This requirement involves a question of fact 
which must be determined with regard to the taxpayer's circumstances. 
If all the relevant requirements of section 26(1) are satisfied, the favourable concessions 
and other provisions of the First Schedule (and some which are found elsewhere in the 
Act) may thus apply to the taxpayer's farming income. These concessions include inter 
alia deductions in respect of the cost of machinery, the determination and treatment of the 
value of livestock and produce, and deductions in respect of 'capital development 
expenditure'. Paragraph 12(1)(1) is of particular importance, as it allows farmers a 
deduction in respect of buildings used in c nnection with farming operations - a highly 
favourable dispensation in the context of the Act. It has been held that these concessions 
place farmers in a privileged position as a class, and the relevant provisions must thus be 
strictly interpreted. This is a principle of considerable significance which, it is submitted, 
should be taken into account at all times when the favourable concessions available to 
farmers under the Act are sought to be applied. This principle is especially relevant, as will 
be shown in chapter 6, when a farmer seeks to apply such concessions to a process of 
manufacturing. 
In the following chapter, the legislative context pertaining to taxpayers carrying on 












3. MANUFACTURING - LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of provisions in the Act which provide concessions to taxpayers who 
carry on manufacturing processes or processes which, in the opinion of the Commissioner 
of SARS,112 are of a similar nature. These concessions are not, it is submitted, equal in 
scope to or as favourable as the concessions available to taxpayers who carry on farming 
operations. There is not, for example, a separate schedule to the Act dealing with the 
computation of taxable income derived from manufacturing processes, nor are there any 
provisions applicable to manufacturers which mirrors the favourable treatment afforded to 
farmers in terms of paragraph 12(1) of the First Schedule. 
An extensive body of case law has arisen as a result of disputes between the Commissioner 
and taxpayers regarding the interpretation of the legislative provisions applying to 
manufacturers. The most pertinent of these provisions and case law for purposes of this 
study will be considered in this chapter. 
It may be noted, firstly, that both sections 12B and 12C previously provided for allowances 
to taxpayers in relation to certain qualifying capital assets (i.e. 'machinery' or 'plant') used 
by them directly in 'a process of manufacture ... or any other process ... which in the 
opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar nature.' 113 However, the relevant provisions in 
section 12B(1) dealing with such assets have recently been repealed,114 and thus the only 
remaining allowance in respect of 'machinery' or 'plant', aimed at taxpayers in general 
who carry on a process of manufacture, is contained in section 12C. The provisions of 
section 12C will be analysed below (in 3.2). 
There is further a highly favourable allowance in section 12E which applies specifically to 
'small business corporations' (as defined in that section),115 namely a deduction of the full 
cost of a qualifying asset used directly in a process of manufacture in the first year of 
use.116 However, as section 12E deals with a very specific type of taxpayer whose factual 
112 Henceforth referred to as the 'Commissioner'. 
Il3 Section 12C(IXa) and (b). 
114 Section 12B(I)(a) and (b) were repealed by section 19(b) of Act No. 31 of2005. 
115 Namely any close corporation, co-operative or any private company, with natural persons as shareholders, 
where the gross income does not exceed R14 million, subject to certain additional requirements - refer to the 
defmition of 'small business corporation' in section 12E(4). 











circumstances must strictly comply with the provisions of that section, it is of too narrow 
application for purposes of this study. 
Sections 12G and 121 also contain concessions in respect of a specified group of taxpayers 
who carry on, inter alia 'manufacturing' of various items, under so-called 'industrial 
projects,}17 While these concessions are aimed at 'attracting foreign investment in ... 
projects ... of strategic economic importance to the Republic,'1l8 and to encourage 
'investment, upgrades and expansions in the manufacturing sector,'1l9 the various 
requirements of these concessions (especially regarding the magnitude of the projects) 
place them out of reach of the average taxpayer carrying on a process of manufacture, as 
envisaged by section 12C. Accordingly, the concessions contained in these sections are not 
included in the ambit of this study. 
Finally, Section 13 provides for an annual deduction of a specified percentage of the cost 
of certain qualifying buildings or improvements thereto (excluding repairs) used by 
taxpayers in carrying on manufacturing processes (or, in certain instances, any other 
process which in the opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar nature). As will be shown 
below, the quantum of the allowance (i.e. what percentage of the cost of the building is 
allowed as an annual deduction) depends on the date of the erection or acquisition of the 
building. 
This chapter will thus further analyse sections 12C and 13, with the emphasis on the 
former section, and the interpretation of the provisions of these sections, where relevant, 
with the aid of legal precedent and commentaries. It will appear from this chapter that 
taxpayers who carry on a process of manufacture may be entitled to certain concessions, 
depending on their factual circumstances, but that they are ultimately not treated as 
favourably as taxpayers who derive income from farming operations. The implications of 
this point will be elaborated upon in chapter 5. 
117 'Industrial project' is defined in sections 12G(1) and 121(1), but is not relevant for present purposes. 
118 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 407, with reference to section 12G. 











3.2. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 12C 
3.2.1. GENERAL 
The legislative intentions behind a depreciation allowance (such as that contained in 
section 12C) are twofold.12o Firstly, as it allows the deduction of the acquisition cost of 
capital assets over a relatively short period, it provides an incentive for taxpayers to 
continually modernise their equipment, with expected benefits in improved industrial 
output. Secondly, taxpayers who do not have access to such a depreciation allowance (and 
are unable to recover the real cost of the asset) may see the price of replacement assets rise 
considerably in an environment of high inflation - the depreciation allowance thus gives 
financial relief in such cases.121 It is clear that accelerated depreciation allowances are an 
effective method of providing fiscal assistance to taxpayers who carry on manufacturing 
processes. Section 12C is a prime example of a depreciation allowance seeking to achieve 
the objectives referred to above. 
The provisions of section 12C which are relevant for purposes of this study include a 
depreciation allowance in respect of machinery or plant owned or acquired by a taxpayer 
for use by him or by his lessee in a process of manufacture. The number of years and 
annual percentage of the allowance will depend on whether the machinery or plant is new 
or used. 
Section 12C(l)(a) provides for a deduction in respect of any: 
'machinery or plant ... owned ... or acquired by the taxpayer ... (and) brought into use for the first 
time (by him) for the purposes of his trade (other than mining or farming), and used by him directly in 
a process of manufacture carried on by him or any other process carried on by him which in the 
opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar nature.' 122 (Emphasis added.) 
The deduction which may be allowed in such an instance is 20% per year (i.e. over five 
years) of the cost to the taxpayer to acquire that machinery or plant, in the case of 
machinery which is not new or unused. On the other hand, if a taxpayer as envisaged in 
section 12C(l)(a) acquires new or unused machinery or plant for the abovementioned use 
on or after 1 March 2002, the deduction will be more favourable, i.e. 40% of the said cost 
120 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 393. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Section 12C(1)(a). The ambit of the phrase 'process ... which in the opinion of the Commissioner is ofa 
similar nature,' has a wider ambit than the phrase 'process of manufacture.' The focus of this study is on the 











in the year in which the asset is first brought into use, and 20% per year for three years 
thereafter (Le. over four years instead of five ).123 
Section 12C(l)(b) also provides for a deduction of 20% per year as described above, but 
differs in the respect that the deduction is allowed to taxpayers who own or acquire 
machinery or plant and lease the assets out. In those cases, the deduction is allowed if the 
asset is brought into use for the first time by the lessee for the purposes of his trade 
(excluding mining or farming) and is used by the lessee directly in a process of 
manufacture carried on by him, or any other process which in the opinion of the 
Commissioner is of a similar nature. The brief discussion which follows regarding the 
interpretation of the wording of section 12C(l) (3.2.2 below) is confined to subsections (a) 
and (b) referred to above. 124 
The Commissioner has issued a Practice Note which sets out lists of processes which are 
regarded as processes of manufacture, processes similar to manufacture, and processes 
which are not regarded either as processes of manufacture or processes similar to 
manufacture.125 While the lists in the latter Practice Note may be useful tools for guidance 
purposes, taxpayers are not bound by them. 126 It should also be noted that any decision 
made by the Commissioner under section 12C (Le. whether a process is or is not a 'process 
of manufacture') is subject to objection and appeal by the taxpayer concemed.127 
Finally it is notable that, even if the allowance under section 12C does not apply (e.g. if the 
'machinery or plant' was not brought into use for the first time by the taxpayer or his 
lessee), the taxpayer may still seek to obtain a deduction for wear and tear or depreciation 
in tenns of section 11 (e). 128 An evaluation of the provisions of section 11 ( e) is beyond the 
scope of this study, as the focus of this chapter is on the provisions specifically applicable 
123 Section 12C(1) proviso (c). 
124 This is due to the fact that the rest of the provisions of section 12C(1) refer to specific taxpayers, i.e. 
agricultural co-operatives, hotelkeepers and owners of aircraft or ships - section 12C(1)(c) - (g). The ambit of 
this study does not include consideration of the limited provisions applicable to such specific taxpayers. 
125 Practice Note: No. 42 (27 November 1995) and Annexures A, B and C thereto; Professional Tax 
Handbook 2008 / 2009, 627. Interestingly, while the lists contained in Annexure B (Processes of 
Manufacture) and Annexure C (Processes not Regarded as Processes of Manufacture or Processes Similar to 
a Process of Manufacture) are specifically described in the Practice Note as not being exhaustive, no such 
qualification precedes Annexure A (Processes Similar to Processes of Manufacture). This is evidently due to 
the fact that the latter processes 'have been accepted as processes similar to a process of manufacture' 
(emphasis added), as noted in the Practice Note, and thus Annexure A appears to be merely a recordal of 
previous decisions in this regard, i.e. an exhaustive list. 
126 Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 12.152. 
127 Section 3(4)(b). 











to taxpayers who carry on a process of manufacturing and are entitled to the Section 12C 
allowance. 129 
In the discussion which follows, the interpretation of some of the more contentious phrases 
(none of which are defined in the Act) in the relevant provisions of section 12C(1) are 
briefly considered, with reference to case law and commentary. 
3.2.2. 'MACHINERY OR PLANT' 
In considering the wording of the applicable portions of section 12C( 1), the first relevant 
phrase which has given rise to some debate, refers to the type of assets concerned, namely 
'machinery or plant'. The term 'machinery' may be defined in general terms as 'machines 
collectively' or 'the components of a machine', while the root noun 'machine' means 'an 
apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function 
and together performing a particular task' .130 While the interpretation of this term has not 
been the subject of judicial consideration by our Courts, it arguably has a fairly easily 
identifiable scope. Taxpayers should thus not be left with much uncertainty as to what 
assets might accurately be described as 'machinery'. 
The word 'plant', on the other hand, has been the subject of some debate. It has been noted 
that the reference to 'machinery or plant', has the effect of widening the ambit of the 
allowance in section 12C(1)( a) and (b). 131 This wide ambit, it is submitted, is demonstrated 
by the fact that the word 'plant' may be defmed as including fixtures, implements, 
machinery and apparatus used in carrying on any industrial process.132 In the case of Blue 
Circle Cement, dealing with an earlier provision preceding section 12C133 (which was 
similar in many respects to the current legislation), the Appellate Division (as it then was) 
investigated the meaning of the word 'plant' in the context of a taxpayer claiming a 
depreciation allowance in respect of railway lines used to convey material from the 
129 The allowance in section l1(e) may be applicable to and useful for a taxpayer who uses an asset in a 
process of manufacture, and for example does not have a cost for the asset or who acquires the asset at the 
end of a lease. 
130 The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 1052. 
13l Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 12.150. 
132 Blue Circle Cement Ltd v CIR 1984 (2) SA 764 (A), 46 SATe 21 at 30, quoting from the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
133 Namely section 12, which provided for the so-called 'machinery initial allowance' and 'machinery 











taxpayer's quarry to its factory, which railway lines were averred by the taxpayer to be 
'plant' .134 
A number of important principles may be gleaned from the judgment in this case. Firstly, 
the Appellate Division espoused the so-called 'functional test' as a useful tool for deciding 
whether a structure mayor may not properly be referred to as 'plant'. This test basically 
seeks to determine the way in which the 'subject-matter' is being used, and if it is 'the 
apparatus or part of the apparatus' which is being used in carrying on the activities of the 
taxpayer's business, it may rightly be regarded as 'plant.' The Court further favoured a 
'common-sense approach' in deciding whether an item may be regarded as 'plant', and 
noted additionally that each case must be decided on its own facts. 135 
Ultimately, the Court found in favour of the taxpayer, holding that the railway lines were 
'part and parcel of the appellant's industrial process', and there was no reason for it not to 
be regarded as 'apparatus used in carrying on the industrial process' in which the taxpayer 
was engaged.136 In reaching its conclusion, the Court regarded the durable nature of the 
railway lines as further proof that it had all the characteristics of 'plant', and that the size of 
an item of apparatus cannot, without more, prevent it from being considered to be 'plant', 
provided the relevant characteristics of 'plant' are otherwise all present. The Court thus 
held that the railway line did constitute 'plant', and that the taxpayer was entitled to the 
applicable allowances. 137 
The afore going principles set out by the Appellate Division have been put to frequent and 
productive use, having been applied in a number of subsequent cases in considering similar 
issues (i.e. whether certain items constitute 'plant' within the meaning of legislation 
similarly worded to section 12C).138 
3.2.3. 'USED ... DIRECTLY IN .. .' 
The past tense form of the verb 'used' should not give rise to much misunderstanding in 
the context of section 12C, and may be defined as to 'take, hold, deploy (something) as a 
134 Blue Circle Cement Ltd v CfR (note 132 above). 
135 Ibid, 31 - 32. 
136 Ibid, 33. 
137 Ibid. 
138 For instance fTC 1468 52 SATe 32 (C) 35,38; fTC 1469 52 SATe 40 (C) 43; and fTC 1479 52 SATe 











means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ'. 139 It is submitted that this word 
indicates that an active process of putting the 'machinery or plant' to use is envisaged in 
order to qualify for the allowance, and not merely the preserving thereof as an investment, 
for example. Put differently, where this phrase is employed in a similar manner elsewhere 
in the Act, it has been held to mean that the subject thereof must be more than merely 
'useful or desirable or even necessary,' but must in fact be used in the particular operation. 
140 It is submitted that the aforegoing comments are applicable in the context of section 
12C, seeing as the word 'used' is employed in a similar fashion. 
The adverb 'directly', however, requires closer scrutiny. This term may be defmed as 'with 
nothing or no one in between,'141 or 'without the intervention of a medium; immediately; 
by a direct process or mode'. 142 It has further been held that the use of this word in this 
particular context indicates that the legislature intended to distinguish between 'plant or 
machinery directly used in a process of manufacture ... and plant or machinery which is 
indirectly so used,' and that 'full effect must be given to this intention.'143 In the same 
case, the preposition 'in' after the word 'directly', was held to require the 'direct 
participation in the process of manufacturing' of the relevant 'machinery or plant' .144 This 
dictum was applied with approval in a subsequent case. 145 
In the Cape Lime case, the Appellate Division considered the application of this phrase in 
the context of a taxpayer seeking to claim capital allowances in respect of certain lorries 
(trucks) which it used in its operations, namely the production of hydrated lime.146 In this 
case it was common cause that the taxpayer was carrying on a 'process of manufacture', 
with the dispute revolving around the question as to whether the taxpayer had used the 
lorries 'directly in' such process.147 In seeking to resolve the aforegoing question, the 
Court regarded as paramount the enquiry, as a matter of law, into where such process 
commences and where it ends.148 After having identified where the process begins (with 
slightly differing emphasis among the three concurring judgments), the majority of the 
139 The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 1942. 
140 Refer to 2.3.3 above regarding paragraph 12(1)(1), where judicial interpretation of the word 'used' is 
discussed in the context of the latter paragraph (with reference to the dicta in ITC 885 (note 101 above». 
141 The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 492. 
142ITC 106126 SATC 317 (C) 319, quoting from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
143 Ibid, 318 - 319. 
144 Ibid, 319. 
145 ITC 1445 51 SATC 40 (T) 47. 
146 SIR v Cape Lime Co Ltd 1967 (4) SA 226 (A), where the Court once again considered the possible 
af.f.lication of the repealed section 12 (note 133 above). 
I lbid,235. 











Court agreed that the lorries were indeed used 'directly in' the process of manufacture. It is 
submitted that the conclusion that the lorries were predominantly used for carrying or 
transporting the raw material from the commencing part of the process to a further part 
thereof, was the deciding factor in favour of the taxpayer:49 In other words (to paraphrase 
the judgment of the Special Court in that instance), the movement of the raw material by 
the lorries was an integral part of the process of manufacture, and they were thus used 
'directly in' that process.150 
It is submitted that the principles above provide clear guidelines which may be applied in 
considering whether an item of 'machinery' or 'plant' is used by a taxpayer 'directly in' a 
'process of manufacture'. The latter emphasised phrase is the fmal relevant portion of the 
wording of section 12C(1) which has been the subject of considerable scrutiny, and the 
interpretation thereof is discussed below. 
3.2.4. 'PROCESS OF MANUFACTURE' 
The term 'process' may be defined as 'a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve 
a particular end; a systematic series of mechanised or chemical operations that are 
performed in order to produce something.'151 (Emphasis added). The emphasised portion 
of the defmition is especially apt to describe the meaning which is probably intended to be 
conveyed by the word in the context of section 12C. The term 'manufacture' is not defined 
in the Act either, and if regard is had to the dictionary meaning, the word may be defined 
as to 'make (something) on a large scale using machinery.'152 Fortunately, as will be 
shown below, the Courts have considered this phrase in some detail, setting out helpful 
guidelines. 
The Appellate Division has passed down two influential judgments where the meaning of 
the phrase 'process of manufacture' was investigated in considerable detail. l53 In the first 
case, that of Hersamar, the taxpayer's operations involved the processing of scrap metal in 
a specific manner so as to prepare it for sale to foundries, which then used the scrap metal 
149 SIR v Cape Lime Co (note 146 above), per the judgments of Wessels JA at 234, Smit AJA at 237 - 238 
and Jennett AJA 240 - 241. 
ISO Ibid, 237. 
lSI The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 1403. 
152 Ibid, 1070. 
153 SIR v Hersamar (Ply) Ltd 1967 (3) SA 177 (A), and SIR v Safranmark (Ply) Ltd 43 SATe 235, 1982 (3) 











for smelting.154 For purposes of carrying out the aforementioned process, the taxpayer 
purchased various items of equipment and claimed certain capital allowances in respect of 
the expenditure thereon, under an earlier version of the Act. 155 
In considering the meaning of the phrase 'process of manufacture', the majority of the 
Court agreed that such a process has taken place if it resulted in a product which is 
essentially different from the existing article before being subjected to the process.156 
However, the Court stressed that the sufficiency of the change is a question of degree, that 
there are no fixed criteria as to when such a change had indeed taken place, and that it can 
only be answered by due consideration of the facts at hand.157 
In finding in favour of the taxpayer (i.e. that it was eligible for the allowances claimed) the 
majority held that the taxpayer's machines were indeed used in a 'process of manufacture', 
as the ultimate product thereof was found to be 'essentially different' to the original raw 
material. This was found to be the case even though the process did not bring about a 
change in the metallurgical composition of the material - i.e. it was still the same material, 
in a physical sense, as its constituent ingredients. The determining factor in this case was 
that the end products of the manufacturing process were specific articles - so-called 
'briquettes and blocks', which were basically compressed pieces of steel created from 
scrap by the taxpayer's process - with considerable utility and commercial purpose. These 
articles were suitable for sale to the taxpayer's main customers (steel manufacturers), 
whereas the raw material (unprocessed steel scrap) did not have these characteristics and 
was not a saleable commodity to the main purchasers. 158 
The second case heard before the Appellate Division in this regard, namely that of 
Safranmark,159 involved a taxpayer claiming certain capital allowances in respect of plant 
and machinery used by it in preparing fried chicken for sale to the public.16o As it was 
common cause that the machines were used by the taxpayer directly in its operations, the 
154 SIR v Hersamar (note 153 above) 273 - 274. 
155 In terms of section 11(2Xd)bis(i) (similar to the current section 12C(1)) of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 
1941 (repealed), which provided for an allowance in respect of 'new or unused machinery or plant brought 
into use by the taxpayer for the purposes of his trade' and which was 'used by the taxpayer directly in a 
Erocess of manufacture.' SIR v Hersamar (note 153 above) 271. 
56 Ibid, 275, with reference to ITC 105226 SATe 253 at 255. 
157 Ibid, 275. 
158 Ibid, 275 - 276. 
159 SIR v Safranmark (note 153 above). 











issue before the Court was whether the taxpayer used the plant and machinery in a 'process 
of manufacture.' 161 
In the majority judgment, the Court reiterated firstly that the question whether on the facts 
at hand, a taxpayer's activities constitute a process of manufacture, is one of law. 162 Next, 
the Court cited and agreed with all of the relevant principles set out in Hersamar's case as 
discussed above, which it then applied in order to determine whether a process of 
manufacture was carried out by the taxpayer in the present case, in its process of cooking 
fried chicken. 163 
In this case, however, in contrast to Hersamar's case, the Court found on the facts that the 
end product of the process was completely different from its ingredients, noting that: 
'The conclusion to be drawn from (the proven facts) ... is that not only did each of the ingredients 
cease to retain its individual qualities, but upon completion of the process a different compound 
substance having a special quality as such, viz edibility and special taste, has been produced, and 
moreover produced in quantity for purposes of trade.' 164 
Interestingly, the majority of the Court seems to have attached considerable weight to the 
quantity of the fried chicken produced by the taxpayer, as well as the 'scale of its 
operations' and the 'large volume of sales', noting that the addition of these factors to 
those quoted above are clear evidence that the machines were used in a process of 
manufacture.165 It has been held, however, that the scale of a taxpayer's operations and the 
fact that a standardised product is created, are not of themselves sufficient factors to 
'convert a particular operation which is not a process of manufacture into such a 
process.,I66 Care should thus be taken to highlight as many relevant considerations as 
possible in seeking to prove that an operation constitutes a 'process of manufacture', 
seeing as no one factor is likely to suffice on its own. 
Based on the two cases cited above, it is submitted that taxpayers seeking to claim the 
capital allowance provided for under section 12C(l), may potentially have considerable 
scope for arguing that an activity undertaken by them qualifies as a 'process of 
manufacture'. While there are certain principles which have been accepted by the 
Appellate Division as indicative of such a process, and which may in themselves be of 
161 SIR v Safranmark (note 153 above) 243. 
162 Ibid, 245. 
163 Ibid, 246 - 247. 
164 Ibid, 248. 
16S Ibid. 











considerable assistance to a taxpayer, the Court does not regard the aforementioned 
principles as hard and fast rules. 
It further appears from the cases cited above, as well as the various cases which have 
subsequently applied the principles set out therein,167 that the closest principle to a 'golden 
rule' in this regard is that the Court will carefully consider the factual circumstances of the 
taxpayer in deciding whether an operation constitutes a 'process of manufacture' . 
If the type of activity carried on by the taxpayer has not previously been held (on similar 
facts) by the Courts to constitute a 'process of manufacture', the taxpayer should first have 
regard to the relevant Practice Note,168 which while not binding may nonetheless be of 
assistance. 169 If neither prior precedent nor the Practice Note is of assistance, it is 
submitted that the taxpayer should carefully apply the principles regarding the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of section 12C(l) to ascertain whether the 
allowance may be available. 
Finally, in light of the comments, principles and authority discussed above, the taxpayer 
seeking to claim the relevant allowance under section 12C(1), should be advised to 
carefully consider the factual circumstances pertaining to the process itself, highlighting 
any factors which may indicate that the process is one of manufacture. It is submitted that 
such a careful consideration of the relevant facts, combined with the thorough application 
of the principles referred to above, should assist the taxpayer in identifying whether the 
allowance is applicable. 
3.3. SECTION 13 
A further concession in the Act aimed at the taxpayer who carries on a 'process of 
manufacture' in the course of his trade (other than mining or farming), is found in 
section 13. Simply put, this section provides for an annual allowance of either 2%, 5% or 
167 Including Automated Business Systems (Pty) Ltd v CfR 1986 (2) SA 645 (n, 649; fTC 1445 (note 145 
above), 44 - 45; fTC 1458 (note 166 above), 140 - 141; CfR v Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd (1988) 51 
SATC 81 (CPD), 87; Ovation Recording Studios (Pty) Ltd v CfR (1990) 3 SA 682 (A), 52 SATC 163, 172; 
and fTC 159157 SATC 212, 219-220. 
168 Note 125 above. 











10% of the cost (less any recoupments) of a qualifying building and any improvements 
(other than repairs) effected thereto, provided the requirements of the section are met. 170 
Broadly speaking, the main requirement common to the various subparagraphs m 
section 13(1) is that the relevant building must have been 'wholly or mainly used during 
the year of assessment . . . for the purpose of carrying on therein any process of 
manufacture in the course of his trade (other than mining or farming),' 171 by the taxpayer 
(or his lessee, as applicable). Whether a deduction will be available at all in respect of the 
abovementioned costs (and, if so, what percentage of such cost will be deductible), will 
depend in large part on the date of erection of the building or the date of commencement of 
the improvements thereto. 
It is submitted that the terms and phrases in section 13 which are most likely to lead to 
interpretational difficulties are 'building', 'wholly or mainly', 'used', 'carrying on' and 
'process of manufacture'. Under various headings in this and the preceding chapter,l72 the 
interpretations of all of the aforementioned phrases were discussed, except that of 'wholly 
or mainly'. As for the phrases already discussed, it is submitted that the principles of 
interpretation set out above are equally applicable in this context, and that the words 
should thus signify corresponding meanings, albeit in a different context. 173 
The phrase 'wholly or mainly' is not defmed in the Act, and regard may thus be had, as a 
starting point, to the dictionary definitions of its constituent parts. The term 'wholly' may 
be defined as 'entirely; fully,'174 and 'mainly' as 'more than anything else; for the most 
part.'175 The interpretation of this phrase in the context of section 13 thus seems quite 
clear, i.e. that the building must be used for manufacturing purposes, either more so than 
for any other purpose (i.e. mainly), or only for manufacturing purposes (i.e. wholly). The 
question as to whether a building is used 'wholly or mainly' for carrying on therein any 
process of manufacture, is one of fact which must be decided on a review of all the 
170 Section 13(1), provisos (b) and (c) thereto and section 13(3); Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 
378. 
171 The additional phrase '... or any other process which in the opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar 
nature' is only used intermittently in section 13(1), i.e. only in paragraphs (b), (d), (dA) and (j). Note further 
that the Commissioner's decision is subject to objection and appeal by the taxpayer in terms of section 
3(4)(b). 
172 Refer to 2.2.1, 2.3.3, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 above. 
173 Even though the interpretation of the term 'building' and the phrase 'carrying on' was discussed in the 
context of taxpayers deriving income from farming operations (2.2.1 and 2.3.3 above), it is submitted that 
their usage in section 13 is in such a similar manner that the earlier comments are equally applicable in this 
context. 
174 The Oxford Dictionary (note 14 above) 2011. 











relevant facts and circumstances.176 In practice, it appears that SARS requires more than 
50% of a building (measured either by floor space or volume) to be used for manufacturing 
processes to qualify for the allowance. l77 
3.4. CONCLUSION - PROCESSES OF MANUFACTURE 
This chapter has set out to identify the most important provisions of the Act containing 
concessions for taxpayers who carry on processes of manufacture, and to discuss the most 
relevant of the said concessions for purposes of this study. A brief overview of the most 
important points is as follows. 
Firstly, it is noted that there is no separate schedule to the Act (such as the First Schedule) 
which deals with the determination of taxable income derived from processes of 
manufacture. In this regard, the most relevant provisions are contained in sections 12C and 
13. Section 12C provides for an allowance in relation to 'machinery' or 'plant' used by 
taxpayers (or their lessees) directly in 'a process of manufacture ... or any other process ... 
which in the opinion of the Commissioner is of a similar nature.' Section 13, on the other 
hand, provides for an annual deduction of a percentage of the cost of certain qualifying 
buildings or improvements thereto (excluding repairs) used by taxpayers in carrying on 
manufacturing processes (or similar processes). 
As the wording of section 12C may lead to interpretational difficulties, some important 
principles were discussed in this regard. The first phrase which was considered is 
'machinery or plant'. The term 'plant' has been the subject of most attention, seeing as it 
considerably widens the ambit of the section and should thus be interpreted with 
circumspection. It has been held that a 'functional test' may be applied to decide whether a 
structure mayor may not properly be referred to as 'plant.' This test investigates how the 
subject-matter is being used - i.e., if it is 'the apparatus or part of the apparatus' used in 
carrying on the activities of the taxpayer's business, it constitutes 'plant'. The durable 
nature of an item may, inter alia, be taken into account in deciding whether an item 
constitutes plant, which is ultimately a question of fact. The next relevant phrase in section 
12C which was considered, is 'used ... directly in ... '. The term 'used' signifies that the 
item must not be merely useful or desirable, but must be actively employed in the 












particular operation. The adverb 'directly' implies the use of the item in 'direct 
participation in the process of manufacturing', i.e. it must be an 'integral part' of the 
process, which may be the case if the item is used, for example, to aid in the progression of 
the said process from one phase to the next. The fmal phrase of relevance in section 12C is 
'process of manufacture'. It has been held that a process of manufacture will result in a 
product which is essentially different from the existing article before being subjected to the 
process. The sufficiency of the change for these purposes is a question of degree. Relevant 
factors which may be considered include, inter alia, the nature and extent of changes to the 
pre-existing article, increased utility and commercial purpose of the end product and the 
specialised nature of the plant and machinery used. Ultimately, however, it remains a 
question of fact whether an operation constitutes a 'process of manufacture, and the Court 
will closely scrutinise the relevant circumstances in reaching its conclusion. 
Lastly, in considering the phrase 'wholly or mainly' in section 13, it was concluded that for 
a building to qualify for the depreciation allowance, it should be used either more for 
manufacturing purposes than for any other purpose (i.e. mainly), or only for manufacturing 
purposes (i.e. wholly). The question is one of fact, however, which will be decided on a 
review of all the relevant facts and circumstances. 
In light of this chapter and chapter 2 above, it is submitted that the concessions for 
manufacturers are not as favourable as those applicable to taxpayers carrying on farming 
operations. This submission is borne out, inter alia, by the following considerations. 
Firstly, there is no schedule to the Act, equivalent to the First Schedule, which contains a 
similar scope of concessions and provisions in respect of processes of manufacture 
specifically. Secondly, the concessions which are aimed at processes of manufacture are 
not as favourable as their counterparts applicable to taxpayers who carry on farming 
operations. For example, the 100% deduction in respect of buildings used in connection 
with farming operations (paragraph 12(1)(1), 2.3.3 above) is far more beneficial than the 
annual allowance in respect of manufacturing buildings in section 13 (3 .3 above). 178 
The significance of the latter point will become evident in the remaining chapters of this 
study, where regard is had to taxpayers who may potentially qualify for the concessions 
under either of these two regimes simultaneously. 
178 A further example is the 3-year depreciation allowance for fanning equipment (section 12B(1)(I) - 2.3.2 
above), compared to the 5- or 4-year allowance in respect of machinery or plant used in a process of 











4. WHERE DO 'FARMING OPERATIONS' END AND OTHER TRADES OR 
ACTIVITIES BEGIN? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters, consideration was given to the fiscal treatment of two distinctive 
types of trade or activity which may be carried on by taxpayers, namely farming operations 
on the one hand, and processes of manufacture on the other. 179 The chapters above focused 
on the relevant legislative provisions applicable to these distinctive trades or activities in 
isolation, as well as numerous instances of applicable case law and commentary. While it 
is thus submitted that the law in this regard is well-developed, this chapter and the 
following examine instances where the waters become somewhat murkier. 
It has been noted that modem production methods may lead to difficulties in interpreting 
the wording of the legislation, particularly those provisions pertaining to farmers, which 
may be even more so in cases where the 'farming operations' of a taxpayer are not easily 
identifiable as such within the context of the legislation. ISO In cases where taxpayers carry 
on farming operations and manufacturing processes simultaneously, such difficulties may 
become particularly vexing. In particular, problems may arise for taxpayers who are part of 
a fairly modem trend: on the one hand, many farmers nowadays carry out activities with 
their produce beyond what is commonly known as 'farming operations', for example, 
processes of manufacture, marketing and distribution. 18l On the other hand, many 
manufacturers (for example, of foodstuffs) choose to produce their own ingredients, thus 
carrying out activities which may appear to be 'farming operations' but may not qualify for 
the farming concessions. IS2 
Such instances may lead taxpayers to seek the application of concessions or favourable 
treatment available for certain activities, to all the operations carried on by them (i.e. both 
their farming operations and further activities). Not surprisingly, the Revenue authorities 
have challenged this type of approach, especially where favourable concessions aimed at a 
179 Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
180 Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 20.5, 20.7 and 2.2.3 above. 
181 In most of the cases which are discussed below, the activities carried out by taxpayers in addition to their 
'farming operations' were not 'processes of manufacture'. However, as will be shown, the principles which 
may be extracted from these cases are nonetheless applicable to farming / manufacturing scenarios. 











particular trade or activity are applied to operations which do not necessarily form part of 
that trade. 
The focus of this chapter is on two cases which are examples of the trend referred to above. 
Both of these cases concerned persons who not only carried on 'farming operations', but 
also distributed their farming produce. The cases discussed below deal with a question 
which lies at the root of the conundrum faced by taxpayers who carry on farming 
operations and manufacturing processes simultaneously, namely: where do farming 
operations cease and other trades or activities begin? While our Courts may not yet have 
considered the latter question in so many words,183 it is submitted that the following two 
cases have given us considerable guidance in this regard. While neither of these cases dealt 
with fiscal legislation, the Courts did consider wording in other statutes and by-laws which 
is similar to the wording currently used in the Act. It is thus submitted that these judgments 
are of considerable value, and a useful starting point. 
In brief, the individual carrying on farming operations in the first case successfully argued 
that his additional distribution activities were included in his 'farming operations', whereas 
the distribution activities in the second case were found not to be so included. This chapter 
seeks to identify the distinguishing factors between the aforementioned cases, based on the 
varying facts, and to analyse the approaches followed by the Courts. While these cases 
were very specific to the particular factual circumstances, it is submitted that the general 
principles which do arise may assist taxpayers who find themselves in similar scenarios, to 
find an answer to the question referred to above. Ultimately, these principles will be 
applied in considering the focal point of the study (with the aid of actual and postulated 
scenarios), namely taxpayers who carry on farming operations and processes of 
manufacturing simultaneously. 
4.2. EMPLOYEES DISTRIBUTING A FARMER'S OWN PRODUCE 
The first case, namely that of Bryant v Minister of Labour and Minister of Justice, 184 dealt 
with a dispute under the erstwhile Wage Act.185 This case was brought before the 
Transvaal Provincial Division under an application for a declaration of rights, with the 
applicant seeking a declaration that his employees were engaged in 'farming operations.' If 
183 Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 20.7. 
184 1943 TPD 205. 











point due to the absence of evidence that hawking had taken place. 194 The Court 
accordingly found in favour of the applicant and granted the declaratory order along the 
lines sought, i.e. ruling that all of the employees were engaged in farming operations, even 
with respect to the distribution of the applicant's produce.195 
This case is an instance of judicial willingness to favour an holistic or inclusive view of 
farming operations as a collection of wide-ranging activities constituting a 'common 
enterprise', even though this may include activities which perhaps do not, within ordinary 
parlance, fall within the meaning of 'farming operations'. It is unfortunate, though, that the 
Court did not have the opportunity of considering whether the hawking or selling of 
farming produce at separate premises might also, without doing violence to the ordinary 
meaning of the tenn, constitute 'farming operations'. A consideration of this issue may 
have provided further useful guidelines. Even though the Court did not decide the 
aforementioned point, however, it is nonetheless submitted that farmers should take care 
not to dispose of their produce in a manner not closely connected to their farming 
operations, such as selling his / her produce from separate premises, for example. For if 
this were the case, it may be very difficult to prove that the said sales activities nonetheless 
fonn part of the farming operations as a mere concluding step thereof, as it may be too far 
removed therefrom and held instead to constitute a separate, independent trade. 
A further notable feature of Bryant's case, even though it was not elaborated upon in the 
judgment, is that the distribution activities of the employees were limited to the applicant's 
own milk, i.e. only the produc  of his own farming operations was distributed. This is an 
important factual circumstance, and one which has played a considerable role in 
subsequent cases, as will be shown below. 
Finally, it has been noted that this case must be read in light of the well-known dictum in 
Ernst's case, namely that the concessions available to farmers under the Act place them in 
a privileged position as a class, and the relevant provisions must thus be strictly 
interpreted. 196 As the latter case was decided in the context of the Act, it is submitted that 
any proposed application of the principles set out in Bryant's case (and other cases 
discussed below which do not deal with tax disputes) in a fiscal context should adhere to 
this general principle. 
194 Bryant (note 184 above) 212. 
195 Ibid. 











4.3. EMPLOYEES DISTRIBUTING FARMING PRODUCE FROM OTHER 
SOURCES IN ADDITION TO THE FARMER'S OWN PRODUCE 
The next case to consider a scenario comparable to that of Bryant's resulted in an adverse 
outcome for the farmer, mainly due to some material factual differences. In the case of 
Giesken;97 the then Appellate Division once again considered the activities of a dairy 
farmer that ostensibly went beyond mere 'farming operations'. 
In this instance, the Court was again not burdened with the intricacies of fiscal legislation, 
but fortunately, as in Bryant's case, the principles set out herein are equally useful in 
interpreting similar wording currently employed in the Act. In this case, the appellants 
were convicted in the Magistrate's Court of contravening the provisions of an arbitration 
award pertaining to a wage dispute, as well as certain 'War Measure' regulations dealing 
with wages of individuals employed in the 'dairy trade' .198 The Transvaal Provincial 
Division found against the ill-fated appellants on their first appeal against the 
conviction,199 and the Appellate Division was thus their last resort to have the conviction 
overturned. The issue to be decided by the Appellate Division was whether the appellants 
were bound by the arbitration award and regulations, which would apparently have 
imposed undesirable obligations on the appellants. The appellants would, however, be 
exempt from the arbitration award and regulations if they could prove that certain of their 
employees' activities constituted 'farming operations.' 
Many of the facts of this case are akin to those of Bryant's. In particular, the appellants 
similarly carried on dairy farming operations on a large scale, and crucially, employed 
their labourers in activities going beyond ordinary farming tasks to also include the 
handling, selling and distribution of milk.200 The Court was ultimately faced with the 
question as to whether the latter distribution activities fell within the ambit of the 
appellants' 'farming operations.'201 The Court relied on the correctness of Bryant's case 
and the principles set out therein (discussed in 4.2 above), to assist it in reaching its 
conclusion. 
197 Rex v Giesken and Giesken [1947] 4 All SA 343 (A). 
198 Rex v Giesken and Another 1947 (1) SA 418 (T) at 419, where it is noted that the defmition of 'dairy 
trade' in the arbitration award included the 'sale and / or distribution of ... milk', but excluded 'farming 
o~erations' from its ambit. 
I lbid,419. 
200 Rex v Giesken and Giesken (note 197 above) 345 - 346. 











Intriguingly, there was a material difference between the facts of this case and that of 
Bryant's, which was ultimately decisive in the dismissal of the present appeal. This 
distinguishing feature was that the employees were not selling and distributing milk solely 
produced by the appellants' own farming operations. Instead, the appellants also purchased 
. large amounts of milk from outside sources on a daily basis, mixed it with their own 
produce of milk and sold the mixture in containers, without any way of identifying whether 
the contents were produced by them or bought from outside sources?02 
In setting out its reasoning in an admirably concise judgment, the Appellate Division firstly 
agreed with the principle that the character of a trade is defined by the nature of the 
enterprise undertaken for a common purpose by the employer and his employees, and that 
once this has been identified, all the employees are engaged in that trade, regardless of 
their individual activities.203 Tellingly, however, the Court went a step further and held that 
an employer and his employees collectively can be engaged in more than one separate 
enterprise, of which farming may be one, provided the appropriate facts are present.204 This 
logical extension of the abovementioned 'common purpose' principle lead the Court to 
reach its decisive finding, namely that the appellants were engaged in two distinct trades at 
the same time, namely the daily purchase and resale of milk from outside sources on the 
one hand, and the production and sale of their own milk on the other?05 This finding was 
based on the appropriate facts of the appellants' case, as set out above. 
The final issue to be decided by the Court was whether the activities relating to the 
purchase and resale (i.e. distribution) of milk from outside sources could form part of the 
appellants' 'farming operations', in light of the arbitration award and 'War Measure' 
regulations. The Court answered this question in the negative, on the basis that such 
distribution activities could only form part of the appellants' 'farming operations' if the 
milk distributed is solely sourced from their own operations.206 As the employees were 
required to distribute milk which was sourced from the appellants' own operations as well 
as from outside sources, the Court held that the arbitration award and 'War Measure' 
regulations were binding on the appellants, and dismissed their appeal. 
202 Rex v Giesken and Giesken (note 197 above) 346 - 347. 
203 Ibid, 347, with reference to Rex v Sidersky 1928 TPD 109 and Bryant (note 184 above) 209. 
204 Ibid, 347. 
205 Ibid. 











In the course of its judgment the Court reached the following conclusion which, it is 
submitted, may be applied in similar scenarios: 
'The sale or distribution of milk obtained from other sources by purchase is not a farming operation, 
even if milk produced by the seller is added. ,207 
It thus appears that the enquiry as to whether a farmer's distribution activities are limited to 
his / her own produce, is a very important factor in deciding whether such activities may 
form part of his / her farming operations. This principle will be referred to again in chapter 
5 below. 
4.4. OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPLES 
The cases discussed in this chapter essentially considered whether the distribution of 
farming produce could conceivably form part of 'farming operations'. This question may 
be answered in the affirmative, as in Bryant's case, provided the necessary facts are 
present, but may well be found to constitute a separate 'trade' or 'enterprise', as in the case 
of Giesken. As was shown, however, certain principles should be employed in deciding 
this issue, and a meticulous consideration of the relevant factual circumstances undertaken. 
The relevant principles may be briefly summarised as follows. 
It has been held that the nature or character of a farmer's enterprise must be considered to 
ascertain whether the 'common purpose' undertaken by that farmer and his / her 
employees are to carry on 'farming operations'. If the latter enquiry is positive, the 
disposal and distribution of farming produce by the farmer may form part of his / her 
farming operations, even if the method of disposal brings the farmer into direct contact 
with the consumer. On the other hand, the factual circumstances may indicate that such 
disposal of farming produce by that farmer constitutes a separate trade apart from his / her 
farming operations. One example where this may potentially be the case is if the disposal is 
carried out from a shop at separate premises. 
It has been held further that an individual may be engaged in more than one separate 
enterprise, of which farming may be one, and that this is a question of fact dependent on 
the particular circumstances. Finally, a crucial factor in deciding whether the distribution 
of farming produce may form part of an individual's farming operations, is that only 
produce which is sourced from an individual's own farming operations may so qualify. 











The abovementioned principles may be applied in considering the question posed in this 
chapter, namely: where do farming operations end and other trades or activities begin? The 
question may be phrased more specifically as: is it possible for activities which may not, in 
ordinary parlance, constitute 'fanning operations', to be included within its ambit, and if 
so, under what circumstances? 
It is submitted that the principles discussed in this chapter may be applied in similar 
scenarios where other activities, which go beyond the ordinary scope of 'farming 
operations' for tax purposes, are sought to be included within its ambit. Such activities may 
include, for example, the distribution, treatment, storage, packaging and processing of 
fanning produce. As will be shown, however, this may only be the case if the necessary 
facts are present. As noted before, the focus of this study is particularly on the possibility 
of 'processes of manufacture' being so included, i.e. where fanning concerns also process 












s. TAXPAYERS WHO CARRY ON 'FARMING OPERATIONS' AND 
'MANUFACTURING PROCESSES' SIMULTANEOUSLY - RELEVANCE 
AND JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the main focus of this study, which is on taxpayers 
who carry on 'farming operations' and 'manufacturing processes' simultaneously. Judicial 
precedents will be discussed to identify further principles which may be relevant to these 
particular taxpayers. Before the case law is discussed, however, the reasoning behind the 
focus of this chapter bears mention. A brief overview of the study thus far will assist in this 
regard. 
Firstly, as referred to in chapter 1, the farming and manufacturing industries are 
foundational to our society, for various economic and social reasons. There are, therefore, 
very strong policy justifications for advancing these industries. One such method employed 
by the State is through favourable fiscal treatment. In chapters 2 and 3 above, it was shown 
that there are provisions in the Act which are particularly beneficial to taxpayers who carry 
on farming operations, and other concessions which favour, to a lesser degree, taxpayers 
who carry on processes of manufacture. The most significant concessions applicable to 
these categories of taxpayer were analysed, while those of lesser import for present 
purposes were also briefly referred to with a view to provide a thorough overview of the 
legislation. Certain interpretational issues were dealt with, to aid in applying the 
legislation, principles and precedents to scenarios set out in the discussions to follow. 
Chapter 4 laid the groundwork for this chapter by discussing a foundational query for 
present purposes, namely: where do farming operations cease and other trades or activities 
begin? Phrased more specifically, the question is: is it possible for activities which may 
not, in ordinary parlance, constitute 'farming operations', to be included within the ambit 
of that phrase, and if so, under what circumstances? This question is relevant for taxpayers 
who seek the fiscal concessions applicable to their 'farming operations', and thus require 
clarity as to which of their diverse operations may qualify as such. Two cases were 
discussed which offer useful guidelines in this regard. These guidelines will in turn be 
employed, along with others discussed in this chapter, in considering a hypothetical 











This chapter (5) focuses specifically on taxpayers who carry on 'farming operations' and 
'processes of manufacture' simultaneously, for it is a relevant modem phenomenon (as 
referred to in 4.1 above), and many taxpayers may potentially fit this description. This 
modem trend may be the result of, inter alia, the increased mechanisation of farming, as 
well as the economic benefits which may be enjoyed by farmers who use their own 
produce in further lucrative processes, such as manufacturing. One example of this 
occurrence is that of farmers who produce crops of grapes, and then use the grapes in 
winemaking activities. In this regard, the case of KWV (5.2.1 below) is of relevance, as 
well as the hypothetical scenario discussed in 6.2 below. 
As discussed at an earlier point, these distinct activities have different concessions which 
may apply, and the provisions applicable to taxpayers carrying on farming operations are 
generally more beneficial than those applying to manufacturing processes (3.4 above). It is 
thus submitted that taxpayers would more likely, depending on their factual circumstances, 
seek to include their processes of manufacture within the ambit of their 'farming 
operations.' Practical examples from case law will be discussed in this chapter in order to 
illustrate this point, and to identify such relevant principles as may be applicable. During 
the course of this discussion, some of the principles referred to in previous chapters will be 
considered afresh, in light of diverse factual circumstances and judicial application. In 
addition, a number of principles which have not been discussed thus far will be brought to 
the fore. 
5.2. CAN 'FARMING OPERATIONS' INCLUDE MANUFACTURING PROCESSES? 
5.2.1. THEKWVCASE 
The Appellate Division, as it then was, applied the principles set out by Bryant's and 
Giesken's cases (chapter 4 above) soon thereafter, in the KWV case.208 Although the latter 
case did not deal with tax legislation, the Court did make certain useful findings on the 
extent of the farming operations of a wine farmer, as will be shown.209 As noted in 5.1, 
wine farmers are a relevant example of taxpayers who carry on farming operations and 
manufacturing activities simultaneously. For this reason in particular, the principles which 
208 Ko-operatieve Wynbouwers Vereniging van Zuid-AJrika Beperk v Industrial Council for the Building 
Industry and Others [1949] 3 All SA 8 (A). 











arise from the KWV case are of considerable relevance. The facts of the KWV case are 
briefly discussed below. 
The appellant (a co-operative agricultural company whose members were, inter alia, wine 
farmers), sought an order (which was refused by the court a quo) declaring that the 
provisions of a certain· 'Building Industry Agreement,210 were not binding on it. This 
agreement determined, inter alia, that all employers and their employees, who are 
associated for the purpose of erecting buildings and structures, would fall within the 
definition of a 'Building Industry' .211 If the said agreement was indeed applicable, it would 
have placed certain undesirable obligations on such employers, the details of which do not 
appear from the judgment. Certain of the appellant's employees were engaged in activities 
including the construction of wine cellars and other structures required for its operations. 
The appellant did not wish to be bound by the terms of the said agreeme t, and thus sought 
the declaratory order referred to above. 
The Court agreed, firstly, with the principle that a taxpayer may be engaged in two or more 
industries at the same time, but held further that one such an industry may be ancillary to 
the other. The Court found that the test in this regard is a question of degree.212 One of the 
factors which the Court had regard to in deciding this question (although not conclusive on 
its own) was a comparison of the total annual disbursements made in connection with the 
distinct industries?13 A further element which the Court took into consideration was the 
number of appellant's staff occupied in the said building operations.214 
The final contention by the appellant was that its employees were employed in 'farming 
operations' (in particular, wine farming), and that these operations were thus exempt from 
the application of the relevant legislation.2lS On this point, the Court conceded firstly that 
the construction of storage tanks on a farm, whether by the farmer himself or by an 
independent contractor, may constitute 'farming operations', depending on the facts.216 
However, the Court found on the facts before it that this was not the case - i.e. the 
construction activities undertaken by the appellant's employees were not 'farming 
operations'. This finding was based, firstly, on the fact that the appellant was a distinct 
210 Promulgated by the Minister of Labour. 
211 KWV(note 208 above) 9. 
212 Ibid, 12 -13, with reference to Giesken's case (note 197 above). 
213 KWV (note 208 above) 14. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid, 16. 











legal person from its members, and that its activities were its own, and not those of its 
members?17 In other words, if such construction activities are carried out by the 
appellant's members (who were inter alia wine farmers), it may well constitute 'farming 
operations' for their purposes, but similar activities carried out by the appellant cannot also 
constitute 'farming operations' merely by reason of having farmers for members. The 
appellant would have to prove that it, too, was in fact a wine farmer, and as will be shown 
below, it could not do so. 
In this regard, the Court made some crucial findings (for purposes of this study) 
concerning the activities carried on by a wine farmer: 
'A wine farmer produces grapes and converts them into wine and brandy: there is no allegation that 
the appellant produces any grapes ... as (the appellant) does not produce any grapes, it cannot be said 
that it is engaged in wine farming. Wine farming consists of a number of different operations, such as 
cultivation of vineyards, pruning of the grape vines, rendering the vines free from disease, gathering 
the crop, pressing the grapes into wine and probably delivering the finished product to the "fIrst 
buyer.",218 (Emphasis added for purposes of the discussion in 5.2.2 below). 
The Court found further that a person who receives grapes for conversion into wine and 
deals with the grapes as he sees fit, is not a wine farmer. This finding was based on the 
principle that operations carried on by or on behalf of a farmer may be 'farming 
operations', but not if performed by or on behalf of a person who is not a farmer?19 
Accordingly, the Court held that 'the construction of wine-receiving tanks in the present 
case is not being performed by o  on behalf of a farmer: it is being performed by a co-
operative agricultural company which is not a farmer,' (emphasis added).220 It was held 
further that the said construction activities were not performed 'on behalf of farmers 
either, as there was no proof that all of appellant's members were farmers (i.e. some of its 
members were wine societies and companies)?21 Accordingly, the application was 
dismissed, as the appellant could not disprove that it was associated with its employees for 
the purpose of erecting buildings and structures, nor prove that its employees were engaged 
in farming operations. 
217 KWV(note208 above) 17. 
218 Ibid, 17 - 18. 













5.2.2. PRINCIPLES ARISING FROM KWV 
The first relevant principle which may be gleaned from this case is that a taxpayer who 
carries on one trade may also prove to be carrying on one or more further trades, but this is 
a question of degree. Factors which may be taken into account in this regard (but should 
not be decisive on their own) include the aggregate expenditure on the distinct trades, as 
well as the number of employees respectively dedicated thereto. Further, while a taxpayer 
may carry on more than one distinct industry or trade (with farming being merely one of 
them), it may be shown that one of these trades is ancillary to the other(s). This is also a 
question of degree. It is submitted that all the relevant facts and circumstances should be 
taken into account in determining this question, including the factors referred to above. 
A further important principle from this case is that a taxpayer who is a legal entity (e.g. a 
company), who seeks to argue that activities undertaken by it constitute 'farming 
operations', should ensure that it is its own activities which are referred to, and not those of 
its 'members' (e.g. shareholders). This is due to the fact that such a taxpayer is a legal 
person distinct from its constituent 'members', and that the nature of their activities cannot 
by implication be imputed to the taxpayer. 
It was also held in this case that an activity may constitute a 'farming operation' when 
performed by or on behalf of a farmer, but will not qualify as such if performed by or on 
behalf of a person who is not a farmer. The Court accepted as correct the example of an 
independent contractor who is engaged by a farmer to plough the farmer's fields - in that 
instance, the Court agreed, the contractor and his employees would be engaged in farming 
operations. 
For purposes of this study, however, the most crucial principle arising from the KWV case 
is based on certain findings by the Court as to the nature of winemaking activities. In 
particular, the Court held that a wine farmer 'produces grapes and converts them into 
wine .. .' and again that wine farming includes 'pressing the grapes into wine .. .' .222 From 
these dicta, two important conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the emphasised text may be 
described, in isolation, as a 'process of manufacture' for tax purposes, as will be shown in 
6.3 below. Secondly, the Court recognised that the aforementioned process constitutes a 
component of wine farming, additional to the production or cultivation of the grapes, 
provided it was performed by an entity engaged in farming operations. 











By implication, therefore, one may conclude that if the necessary facts are present, a 
'process of manufacture' may be included within the scope of 'farming operations'. It is 
submitted that there is no reason why such a conclusion should be limited to wine farmers, 
to the exclusion of other farmers with similar factual circumstances. This is borne out by 
further judicial commentary on the subject and the practice of SARS,223 and is of crucial 
significance for purposes of the hypothetical scenario postulated in 6.2. 
The Court further confmned (in the rest of the quoted portion referred to above) that the 
delivery or distribution of the finished product (Le. wine) may constitute a part of wine 
farming, thus recognising that such activities (referred to hereinafter as 'post-farming' 
activities for purposes of convenience) may also fall within the ambit of 'farming 
operations' ?24 This is further confirmation of the decisions in Bryant's and Giesken's 
cases, which first recognised the aforementioned principle?25 
The abovementioned ratio in the KWV case is of particular relevance as it confirms that a 
'process of manufacture' may be included within the ambit of 'farming operations.' Such 
post-farming activities, especially processes of manufacture, it is submitted, should 
nonetheless be limited to the use of the taxpayer's own produce, and not include produce 
from outside sources.226 
5.2.3. APPLICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES FROM KWV 
The principles crystallised in the KWV case were applied shortly thereafter by the Cape 
Provincial Division in the Porterville Ko-op case.227 The Court in that case dealt with a 
similar scenario, finding that activities carried out by an agricultural co-operative on behalf 
of its farmer members were not 'farming operations' (Le. 'boerderybedrywighede', In 
Afrikaans), as the co-operative was not itself engaged in farming.228 
The Court held, firstly, that the phrase 'farming operations' describes work done on a farm 
with the intention to bring forth produce, but that it can also have a 'wider meaning,' which 
223 5.2.3 - 5.3 below. 
224 KWV (note 208 above) 17 - 18. 
225 Discussed in 4.2 and 4.3 above. 
226 This principle arises from the Bryant and Giesken cases (4.2 and 4.3 above). It is submitted that this 
suggestion accords with the strict approach to the interpretation of farming concessions, as per Ernst's case 
(note 196 above). 
227 Rex v Porterville Ko-op Landbou Mpy Bpk [1952] 1 All SA 278 (C). This case did not deal with fiscal 
legislation, but with a charge of the contravention of Act 30 of 1928. The meaning of the phrase 'farming 
operations' ('boerderybedrywighede') was considered in this case, however, which is why it is of relevance. 











includes the production or selling of fanning produce (i.e. post-fanning work) by a fanner 
or his employees, as long as the produce arose from the fanner's own operations.229 The 
Court found that this wider meaning is not wide enough, however, to include situations 
where post-fanning work is done in relation to fanning produce by persons other than the 
fanner himself.23o In the COUl1's view, the difference lay therein that persons who carry out 
such post-fanning work in the former scenario are producing 'from and out of a fann' (my 
translation of the Afrikaans), whereas in the latter case they are not.231 
It is submitted that this finding is not inconsistent with that of the Appellate Division in the 
KWV case, namely that operations carried on by or on behalf of a fanner may be fanning 
operations, but not if performed by or on behalf of a person who is not a fanner?32 The 
point made in Porterville's case is that the inclusion of post-farming work within the ambit 
of a taxpayer's farming operations is only justifiable if such work is carried out by the 
producer (i.e. the fanner) himself, while the quoted dictum from KWV, on the other hand, 
refers to activities which are manifestly still part of normal farming operations. This 
submission is borne out, firstly, by the fact that the activities which the appellant in KWV 
sought to include within the ambit of its farming operations were not post-farming 
activities. The difficulty for the appellant was rather that they were not its own fanning 
activities. In addition, the Court held in KWV that a person who receives produce (i.e. from 
the producer) for conversion into a final product, and then deals with the produce as he 
sees fit, is not carrying on farming operations.233 The principle from Porterville referred to 
above is thus that post-fanning activities can only be included within a taxpayer's fanning 
operations if the produce arose from his own operations. 
In reaching its verdict, the Court in Porterville's case relied on the judgments of Bryant, 
Giesken and KWV, as is apparent from the above.234 It is submitted that Porterville's case 
thus provides further evidence of judicial willingness to include post-farming work in 
relation to fanning produce (which may include processes of manufacture) within the 
phrase 'fanning operations', if the necessary factual circumstances are present. In other 
words, a 'wider meaning' may be applied to that phrase (subject to the limitation discussed 




232 KWV (note 208 above) 17 - 18. 
233 Ibid, 18. 
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above). It is the application of this 'wider meaning' which is of considerable importance 
for purposes of this chapter and chapter 6 below. 
A further instance of judicial application of the principles set out in KWV and the 
preceding cases referred to above is that of Ambleside Tobacco,235 a case decided by the 
High Court of the erstwhile Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). While this case was 
decided under the laws of a neighbouring country, it is submitted that the application by 
that Court of the principles set out in the cases of Bryant, Giesken and KWV is nonetheless 
of persuasive value.236 This is even more so as consideration was given to a factual 
scenario with similarities to the aforementioned South African cases. 
In the Ambleside Tobacco case, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs, who carried on 
business as tobacco graders, were engaged in 'farming operations'. The Court agreed with 
the premise that certain activities carried on by a farmer subsequent to his 'basic processes 
of growing and reaping of crops or raising of stock ... ' may be regarded as 'incidental to 
the activities or undertaking of a farmer.' The Court found further that 'the grading by a 
tobacco farmer is (no) less incidental to him as being a farming operation as was the 
selling and delivery of the milk produced by the dairy farmer in Bryant's case. ,237 
(Emphasis added in both instances). The emphasised word in the quoted passages indicates 
an interesting interpretation of the principle in Bryant's case, namely that the post-farming 
activities of a farmer should be incidental to (i.e. subsidiary or supplementary to i 38 his 
farming operations, in order to constitute a part thereof. This approach, it is submitted, is a 
further useful guideline. 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, as the plaintiffs were not themselves tobacco farmers 
and their activities were limited to tobacco grading, they were not engaged in farming 
operations.239 The Court reconciled this finding with the principle that the nature of the 
enterprise in which an employer and its employees are associated for a common purpose 
must be considered, and not the 'special nature' of the work carried out by the 
employees.24o The Court held that the latter principle applies to the relationship between 
the plaintiffs and the farmers on whose behalf they conduct the tobacco grading, so that the 
235 Ambleside Tobacco Grading Co (Pvt) Ltd v Abrahamson, NO 1959 (1) SA (SR). 
236 Ibid, 3 - 4. 
237 Ibid, 3, with reference to the decision in Bryant's case (4.2 above). 
238 S Hawker The Little Oxford Dictionary & Thesaurus (1998) 250. 
239 Ambleside Tobacco (note 235 above) 4. 












plaintiffs (as independent contractors) and the farmers are jointly associated in farming 
operations as a common purpose?41 This did not mean, however, that the common purpose 
of the plaintiffs and their employees constituted farming operations, in the Court's 
judgment (seeing as the plaintiffs were not farmers themselves), even though the services 
rendered by the plaintiffs to the farmers were incidental to the farmers' operations.242 This 
latter fmding, it is submitted, confIrms the soundness of the limitation placed on the 'wider 
meaning' to 'farming operations' as per the Porterville case; i.e. even though the tobacco 
grading was carried out on behalf of farmers, such post-farming activities were carried out 
by the plaintiffs who did not produce the tobacco themselves by farming, and the 'wider 
meaning' could thus not apply. 
While the Court did not consider whether tobacco grading was a process of manufacture, it 
is submitted that this case (in dealing with post-farming activities pertaining to farming 
produce) nonetheless provides further useful guidelines for purposes of this chapter. 
5.2.4. THE BEHR CASE 
Not long after the cases discussed above were decided, the Cape Provincial Division heard 
an appeal from an individual who carried on farming operations (the cultivation of trees for 
timber) but also operated a saw-mill on his farm?43 The appellant was charged and 
convicted by a Magistrate's Court with the contravention of certain legislative provisions 
in terms of which he was alleged to have wrongfully and unlawfully operated a factory 
without a registration certifIcate.244 The appellant appealed against the conviction. 
While this case thus did not deal with fIscal legislation, the Court did consider the question 
whether the appellant's saw-milling activities (a process of manufacture, as will be shown 
below) were performed by him solely in connection with his farming operations?45 
Although the latter emphasised wording is not used in section 26( 1) of the Act, it is 
submitted that the issue in this case, which is essentially whether the appellant's 
manufacturing activities were inextricably linked to his 'farming operations', corresponds 
with the central theme of this chapter. 
241 Ambleside Tobacco (note 235 above) 4. 
242 Ibid, with reference to the KWV case (note 208 above) 18. 
243 S v Behr 1962 (3) SA 109 (C). 
244 As per the erstwhile Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, 22 of 1941. 











The definition of 'factory' under the applicable legislation was crucial in this case. This 
definition excluded from its ambit such premises 'on which a farmer ... performs work ... 
solely in connection with products which he has produced on a farm occupied by him, or 
solely in connection with his farming operations. ,246 The appellant argued that this 
exclusion applied to his saw-mill (i.e. it was not a 'factory', as defined), as he was a farmer 
whose work on those premises 'included the sawing and processing of timber for sale in 
the form of box-wood,' but that such activities were carried out solely in connection with 
his farming operations.247 
Before discussing the Court's judgment, some preliminary remarks regarding the above 
process are appropriate. While the definition of a 'factory' was considered in Behr's case 
under separate legislation, it is submitted that saw-milling activities such as the appellant's 
would constitute a 'process of manufacture' under the Act, based on the following 
reasoning. The saw-milling activities (as described in the case) were a 'process,248 by 
which raw timber is converted into finished products (fruit box components), which are 
'essentially different' to the constituent raw materials (unprocessed timber), inter alia as 
regards physical attributes (box components have shapes and dimensions not possessed by 
raw timber), utility (the components may be assembled for use in packaging; raw timber 
cannot), and potential saleability as a completely different commodity?49 In addition, 
Practice Note 42 includes the 'felling, trimming, debarking and cutting into specified 
lengths of forest produce (excluding farmers)' as a 'Process of Manufacture. ,250 
This case is relevant, therefore, because it dealt in essence with a farmer seeking to include 
a 'process of manufacture' within the ambit of his 'farming operations', even though this 
was in the context of non-fiscal legislation with very specific requirements. In other words, 
the appellant basically sought to attach a 'wider meaning' to the phrase 'farming 
operations', as was discussed in the KWV case (see 5.2.3 above) - and for this reason 
Behr's case invites close scrutiny in the present context. 
246 S v Behr (note 243 above) Ill. 
247 Ibid. 
248 The activities described above arguably entail a 'series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a 
p,articular end' - the end being the fabrication of fruit boxes; see 3.2.4 above. 
49 Refer to 3.2.4 above for a discussion, with reference to case law, of the phrase 'process of manufacture' . 
250 In particular Annexure B thereof (note 125 above). Even though the Practice Note specifically excludes 
farmers as regards such activities, it is referred to here simply to strengthen the submission that the 











In its judgment, the Court accepted, firstly, that the appellant's 'fanning activities' 
consisted of the 'planting of trees ... and the sale of timber. ,251 (Emphasis added). The 
Court's view that the sale of fanning produce could also constitute 'fanning activities,' 
corresponds with case law on this point.252 The Court found further that the saw-milling 
operation was the kind of activity referred to in the abovementioned definition of 'factory' , 
and thus it remained to consider whether either of the exclusions from that definition in the 
applicable legislation was applicable. Firstly, as the appellant not only used his own timber 
in the mill, but also timber from outside sources, the Court found that he did not use the 
mill 'solely in connection with products which he has produced on a fann occupied by 
him.' The appellant's saw-mill could thus only have been excluded from the definition of a 
'factory' if it was used solely in connection with his farming operations (Le. in terms of the 
second exclusion), but the Court found against the appellant in this regard toO?53 In the 
Court's view, the legislative intention with the second exclusion (emphasised above), was 
to extend the said exemption to manufacturing activities using products from outside 
sources, but only if such activities are performed solely in connection with the individual's 
own fanning operations?54 
A caveat should be noted in this regard, however, with reference to Giesken's case and the 
subsequent judicial application thereof.255 In particular, the phrase 'fanning operations' has 
been held not to include post-fanning work by a fanner using produce from an outside 
source. It should be noted that in Behr's case, however, the Court's view of the legislative 
intent was strictly in the context of the very specific enactment considered. In spite of this 
qualification, however, it is submitted that the Court's findings in this case are nonetheless 
of use. The Court ultimately found against the appellant, holding that the saw-mill was not 
an integral part of his farming operations without an independent existence, and was thus 
not used solely in connection with his fanning operations?56 It is the emphasised portion of 
the latter finding which, it is submitted, is of relevance for purposes of this chapter, based 
on the following reasoning. 
Taxpayers seeking to draw a process of manufacture undertaken by them into the ambit of 
their farming operations might further bolster their argument if it can be shown that the 
251 Sv Behr (note 243 above) llO. 
252 As discussed in 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2.1 above. 
253 S v Behr (note 243 above) 112. 
254lbid, III - 112. 
255 Refer to the discussions in 4.3 and 5.2.1 above. 











process is an integral part of their farming operations, without an independent existence. 
This might be the case, for example, if a taxpayer grows crops of fruit and simultaneously 
operates a plant where only his own fruit is converted into processed products, such as jam 
or preserves. The taxpayer could thus argue that the plant is the concluding step of his 
farming operations (i.e. it is an integral part thereof), and it is strictly intended and used for 
the processing of his own farming produce (i.e. it has no independent existence, in an 
operational sense, from his farming operations). The aforementioned factors could thus 
support an argument that the said manufacturing process is not a separate trade for tax 
purposes, but should be included within the taxpayer's farming operations. 
As the Courts apply a strict approach to the concessions available to farmers as a 
privileged class,257 it is submitted that such taxpayers may benefit from applying this 
principle from Behr's case - which sets a high threshold for so extending the privilege. 
This principle might thus be a further element of a persuasive argument, as referred to 
above. 
5.3. PRACTICE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE 
It appears that SARS, in practice, will regard taxpayers who use their own farming produce 
in a process of manufacture (for example, in winemaking or the processing and canning of 
fruit) as carrying on only 'farming operations', i.e. even in respect of that manufacturing 
process.258 However, if the same taxpayer uses produce from outside sources to a material 
extent in his / her process of manufacture, SARS is likely to regard the taxpayer as 
carrying on two distinct trades (i.e. farming and manufacturing). 259 
Firstly, it should be noted that the departmental 'practices' of SARS, in terms of which it 
assesses taxpayers, do not have the force of law,26o but the Act nonetheless precludes the 
Commissioner from raising an additional assessment if an amount was not assessed to tax 
due to a 'practice generally prevailing' at the date of the assessment?61 A general caveat 
should be borne in mind, however, namely that a particular interpretation of a provision of 
the Act will not necessarily be upheld by the Court, even if that construction has been 
followed for a considerable period of time by SARS and a lower Court, if that 
257 Ernst's case (note 67 above) 343. 
258 De Koker Silke (note 11 above) 15.32. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Williams Law and Practice (note 12 above) 16. 











interpretation is not supported by the clear words of the particular provision?62 
Accordingly it is submitted that the abovementioned practice of SARS should not be relied 
upon by taxpayers in isolation, without due consideration of all relevant facts and 
principles as set out in this chapter and chapter 4 above. 
Moreover, it has been noted that difficulties may arise if SARS were to regard a farmer 
who uses his produce in carrying on a process of manufacture, as being engaged in two 
distinct trades.263 In particular, it may be difficult to ascertain the farmer's taxable income 
from his farming operations, as neither the Act nor the First Schedule provides for the 
apportionment of income between two such distinct trades.264 It would therefore be 
preferable, not only insofar as the favourable farming concessions are concerned, but also 
from a compliance point of view, for a taxpayer's process of manufacture to be regarded as 
part of his farming operations, if the facts so permit. 
A possible solution has been suggested which may assist a taxpayer to justify the latter 
approach, and so to avoid the difficulties posed by viewing his farming operations and 
manufacturing processes as two distinct trades. This solution suggests a review of the facts 
in order to ascertain which of the two trades may be regarded as the taxpayer's main trade, 
and then regarding the income from both distinct trades as arising from the main trade.265 It 
is submitted that this approach may be justifiable in light of the Court's findings in the 
KWV case (see 5.2.1 above), namely that a taxpayer who carries on two distinct trades may 
argue that the one trade is ancillary to the other. As noted, however, this is a question of 
degree, and account may thus be taken of the factors noted as relevant by the Court in that 
case, including the respective aggregate expenditure and number of employees dedicated to 
the distinct trades.266 
5.4. OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPLES 
Chapter 4 introduced the premise that certain activities (such as distribution) may be 
included within the ambit of 'farming operations', even though they may not be so 
regarded in ordinary parlance. This chapter elaborated on that premise by arguing that, 
under certain circumstances, taxpayers who carry on farming operations and processes of 
262 Ernst's case (note 67 above) 344. 
263 Meyerowitz (note 44 above) 20.8. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 











manufacture simultaneously may regard the latter processes as forming part of their 
farming operations. Chapter 6 will apply these principles to a postulated practical example, 
and illustrate how such guidelines may have beneficial results from a tax perspective. 
Before the next chapter is introduced, however, a brief summary of the relevant principles 
discussed in this chapter follows below. 
Firstly, taxpayers who carry on more than one trade simultaneously (with farming being 
one), may aver that one of their trades is ancillary to the other(s), with relevant factors such 
as the expenditure and number of employees respectively dedicated thereto. Taxpayers 
who are legal entities, seeking to make such averments regarding their operations should, 
however, ensure that it is their own operations which are considered, and not those of their 
members. A principle which follows from the latter is that activities may constitute 
farming operations if carried on by or on behalf of a farmer, but will not qualify as such if 
performed by or on behalf of a person who is not a farmer. In addition, certain findings of 
the Appellate Division with respect to wine farmers267 support the submission that a 
'process of manufacture' may be included within the scope of 'farming operations,' 
provided the taxpayer's factual circumstances justify such a fmding. The latter point is 
confirmed by judicial recognition that a 'wider meaning' may be attached to the phrase 
'farming operations,' so that it may include the processing or selling of farming produce, 
as long as such post-farming work is carried on by the farmer himself. 
A further principle which arose from case law is that post-farming activities should be 
incidental to (i.e. subsidiary or supplementary to) a taxpayer's farming operations to be 
potentially included within the ambit of such operations. An argument for the inclusion of 
a manufacturing process within the scope of a taxpayer's farming operations may also be 
augmented if such a post-farming process is an integral part of the taxpayer's farming 
operations, without an independent existence. 
Finally, it has been noted that SARS may in practice support such an argument, but that 
close regard will nonetheless be had to the taxpayer's factual circumstances (such as 
whether the taxpayer uses only produce from his own farming operations). However, 
seeing as SARS' practices are not binding in law, nor will they be upheld by the Courts if 
considered to be contrary to unambiguous wording of the Act, it is submitted that 
taxpayers should not rely on the abovementioned practice without putting forth a well-
considered argument. 











The aim of this study is thus to identify, as far as possible, general principles which may be 
of assistance to taxpayers seeking to formulate a convincing argument. It should be noted, 
however, that no single guideline is likely to suffice if applied on its own, especially in 
light of the strict approach to the concessions available to farmers as a privileged class. It is 
therefore submitted that a carefully constructed argument should apply as many of the said 
guidelines as are applicable to the taxpayer's facts, so as to ensure the highest possible 
likelihood of success. 
The following chapter aims to formulate, for illustrative purposes, an argument for the 
inclusion of a 'process of manufacture' within the scope of a taxpayer's 'farming 
operations,' with the aid of a hypothetical scenario. It should be noted, however, that while 
the hypothetical scenario postulates a taxpayer farmer who carries on wine farming 
activities, there are other examples of taxpayers who similarly carry on both manufacturing 
processes and farming operations. Such examples include cattle farmers who operate 
abattoirs, maize or wheat farmers who carry out milling operations, and fruit farmers who 











6. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters (4 and 5) set out various principles with reference to judicial 
commentaries and the literature. These principles may be useful to taxpayers who carry out 
farming operations and a process of manufacture simultaneously, and seek to apply 
farming concessions to the latter process for tax purposes. It is submitted, however, that the 
relevance of these principles may be best illustrated with the aid of a practical example. 
Accordingly, the hypothetical scenario set out in this chapter could serve as a basis for the 
practical application of the abovementioned principles, and in formulating an argument in 
favour of the beneficial fiscal treatment sought by the postulated taxpayer. Thereafter, the 
relevant concessions which may apply to his operations are referred to, with submissions 
as to why the particular concessions may be beneficial to the said taxpayer. 
6.2. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
The scenario which is considered in this chapter is that of a farmer (the Taxpayer) who 
plants, cultivates and harvests grapes on his own wine farm. A certain portion of such 
produce is sold in bulk, unprocessed, for human consumption in the form of fresh grapes -
but only the farmer's own produce is so distributed. The Taxpayer applies various tax 
concessions available to farmers in terms of section 26(1) and the First Schedule to the 
aforementioned farming operations, but this part of his activities will not be considered in 
great detail. The main focus of this chapter pertains to the operations described below. 
The remaining portion of the Taxpayer's crop of grapes is used concurrently by him in an 
integrated winemaking operation, including all pressing, fermentation, maturation, 
bottling, labelling and packaging processes, through which a finished product (i.e. bottled 
and labelled estate wine) is ultimately created, then sold and distributed by the Taxpayer. 
No raw materials (i.e. harvested grapes) are acquired from outside sources for use by the 
Taxpayer in the said winemaking operations. The Taxpayer employs various assets in the 
course of his winemaking operations, including specialised equipment such as pumps, 
tanks and barrels, bottling, labelling and packaging equipment, and buildings such as 











expenses (and continues to do so) in respect of all of the aforementioned assets, and seeks 
relief for tax purposes, if possible. 
The Taxpayer is considering the application of certain farming tax concessions to his 
winemaking operations that, if possible, will be more beneficial to him for tax purposes 
than the relevant manufacturing provisions. However, in order to justify the application of 
such farming concessions to his winemaking operations, the Taxpayer seeks to formulate a 
cogent argument. The suggested elements of such an argument are discussed under the 
heading immediately below. Thereafter (in 6.4), the relevant concessions which may apply 
to the Taxpayer's winemaking activities, should the argument in favour of such treatment 
be successful, are discussed. 
6.3. FORMULATING THE ARGUMENT: APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION AND 
PRINCIPLES 
On close scrutiny of the hypothetical scenario posited above, the Taxpayer could argue that 
the income from his winemaking activities is, in fact, derived from 'other farming 
operations', as envisaged in section 26(1).268 If the Taxpayer can formulate a convincing 
argument in this regard, the taxable income derived from his winemaking activities should 
fall to be 'determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act but subject to the 
provisions of the First Schedule. ,269 This would thus enable him to justify the application 
of certain favourable provisions of the First Schedule in respect of such winemaking 
operations, where relevant. 
Firstly, the Taxpayer's farming activities involve 'agricultural' operations, i.e. 'the 
production of produce from a land-based economy,.270 It is further clear that the Taxpayer 
himself is 'carrying on' such operations, as he is engaged in an activity in the nature of 
farming, and evidently possesses a genuine intention to carry on farming operations 
profitably?71 It is thus submitted that the income derived from the Taxpayer's cultivation 
of grapes should be dealt with in terms of section 26(1) and the First Schedule. In addition, 
the Taxpayer's sale and distribution of his farming produce (i.e. fresh grapes) arising from 
the latter agricultural activities, may arguably be included within the ambit of his farming 
268 2.2.3 above. 
269 Section 26(1). 
270 fTC 1373 (note 36 above) 194. 











operations, as he is distributing only his own produce.272 Based on the latter factor, the said 
distribution activities do not constitute a separate trade, but rather form part of the 
'enterprise undertaken for a common purpose' by the Taxpayer, namely the carrying on of 
'farming operations. ,273 It is thus submitted that the income derived by the taxpayer from 
these activities should al~o fall to be dealt with in terms of section 26( 1) and the First 
Schedule. It is thus evident that certain 'post-farming' activities of the Taxpayer may, on 
the basis of principles arising from case law and commentaries, be included within the 
ambit of his farming operations. 
As for the Taxpayer's winemaking operations, the following comments apply. It should be· 
noted, firstly, that the process of winemaking (in isolation) constitutes a 'process of 
manufacture' within the context of the Act and as interpreted through judicial 
commentaries and the literature.274 This submission is based on the following reasoning. 
Winemaking, or 'pressing grapes into wine,'275 logically entails the conversion of raw 
material (grapes) by a 'process,276 into a finished product (wine), which is an 'essentially 
different' substance to its constituent raw materials, int r alia as regards its physical 
attributes (being a liquid, as opposed to a solid), chemical make-up (for example, it 
contains alcohol whereas unfermented, fresh grapes do not), utility (it may be consumed by 
drinking, whereas grapes - in solid form - cannot) and its potential saleability as a 
completely different commodity with a (potentially) much higher value?77 Not only is the 
Taxpayer's winemaking process thus a post-farming process (in other words, carried out 
by using produce from his farming operations),278 but also a very specific type of post-
farming process - namely one in respect of which certain concessions may be applicable 
under the Act. The question thus arises as to which concessions, if any, should apply to the 
said winemaking activities. Should the Taxpayer accept that the less favourable 
manufacturing concessions should apply thereto, or should he seek to draw the latter 
process within the ambit of his farming operations, so as to justify the application of 
concessions available to farmers in terms of section 26(1) and the First Schedule? As 
272 Rex v Giesken and Giesken (note 197 above) 348; 4.3 above. 
273 Ibid. 
274 KWV(note 208 above) 17 -18; and the discussion in 5.2.1 above. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Wine pressing is a 'process', i.e. a 'series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end' -
the end being the production of wine; see 3.2.4 above. 
277 Refer to 3.2.4 above for a discussion, with reference to case law, of the phrase 'process of manufacture'. 











previously analysed, and summarised in 6.4 below, the latter option IS clearly more 
favourable for the Taxpayer from a tax point of view. 
The argument in favour of including the winemaking process as a part of the Taxpayer's 
farming operations is as follows. The Taxpayer may argue, firstly, that his winemaking 
activities form part of his common purpose of carrying on 'other farming operations', in 
the context of section 26(1).279 In so doing, the Taxpayer should recognise that the latter 
general phrase widens the ambit of and takes its meaning from the context of the 
aforegoing specific phrases (i.e. 'pastoral' and 'agricultural,)?80 The Taxpayer thus argues 
that the phrase 'other farming operations' includes his winemaking activities, for the latter 
process is concerned with and related to the primary production of produce from a land-
based economy.281 
In expanding on the point made above, the Taxpayer may argue that his winemaking 
process does not constitute a separate enterprise or trade, but that it is rather an ancillary 
activity to his farming operations?82 As this is a question of degree, the Taxpayer may 
highlight any relevant factors which may verify this contention, based on his factual 
circumstances.283 For instance, he may emphasise the fact that it is only his own farming 
produce which is being used in his winemaking process, and that none of the farming 
produce so used is acquired from outside sources?84 In addition, the Taxpayer may argue, 
if this can be verified on the facts, that his total annual disbursements on the winemaking 
process, as well as the number of employees dedicated thereto, does not overshadow the 
resources committed to his strictly 'agricultural' operations (i.e. the planting, cultivation 
and harvesting of grapes). 285 A further factor which may justify the abovementioned 
submission is that the Taxpayer is a natural person who conducts his own farming 
operations, and does not conduct such operations on behalf of other farmers.286 It may be 
argued that this is apparent if regard is had to the Taxpayer's activities pertaining to the 
cultivation of grapes - i.e. his 'agricultural' operations as discussed above. The Taxpayer 
279 4.2 above. 
280 Kellaway (note 42 above) 148, with reference to Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 154; 
2.2.3 above. 
281 ITC 1373 (note 36 above) 193; 2.2.3 above. 
282 KWV(note 208 above) 12, with reference to Giesken's case (note 197 above); 5.2.1 above. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Rex v Giesken and Giesken (note 197 above) 348; 4.3 above. 
285 KWV(note 208 above) 14; 5.2.1 above. 
286 Ibid (KWV) 17. In other words, the Taxpayer does not conduct winemaking on behalf of other persons 
(who mayor may not be carrying on farming operations themselves), nor is he seeking to include any other 











thus basically seeks the attribution of a wider meaning to the phrase 'other farming 
operations' in section 26(1), so as to include his winemaking process therein.287 The fact 
that he processes his own farming produce is an important indication that he does not 
thereby over-extend the said wider meaning.288 The Taxpayer may ultimately argue, in 
light of the various factors discussed above, that his winemaking process is incidental to 
(i.e. subsidiary or supplementary to) his farming operations,289 which should further justify 
the inclusion thereof within the ambit of his farming operations. 
A further element which may be incorporated by the Taxpayer into his argument is the 
submission that his winemaking process is an integral part of his farming operations 
without an independent existence?90 The Taxpayer may substantiate this submission by 
arguing that his winemaking process is the concluding step of his farming operations and 
would not have been carried out apart from his farming operations, as he uses only his own 
produce in that process. Such a submission lends further support to the argument that the 
Taxpayer's winemaking process is not a separate trade for tax purposes, but should be 
included within his farming operations?91 
Finally, the Taxpayer may argue that the current practice of SARS seems to support the 
view that his manufacturing process (his winemaking activities) is merely a part of his 
'farming operations' for purposes of section 26(1) and the First Schedule, and that the 
applicable farming concessions should thus be available to that process as well.292 This 
averment should be based on all of the abovementioned factors, with special emphasis on 
the factor that the Taxpayer only uses produce arising from his own farming operations in 
the said manufacturing process. In relying on this practice, however, the Taxpayer should 
take note of the caveats set out in 5.3 above in respect of reliance on the practice ofSARS. 
The argument above, based on the facts in the postulated scenario and the guidelines 
provided by case law, does not purport to provide a comprehensive list of all the relevant 
factors which may be taken into account by other taxpayers in a similar position to that of 
the hypothetical Taxpayer. The aforegoing rather serves as an example of the type of 
principles and factors which may be taken into account in similar instances. The final 
287 Porterville (note 227 above) 280; 5.2.3 above. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ambleside Tobacco (note 235 above) 3; 5.2.3 above. 
290 Sv Behr (note 243 above) 112; 5.2.4. 
291 Ibid. 











portion of this chapter briefly discusses the relevant concessions which may be applicable 
to the Taxpayer's activities. 
6.4. CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE CONCESSIONS 
The discussion to follow assumes that the Taxpayer's argument above, based on the facts 
of the hypothetical scenario, will be successful - i.e. it is postulated that SARS will agree 
that the Taxpayer's winemaking activities (strictly speaking, a 'process of manufacture') 
form part of his 'farming operations.' 
The first consequence of the successful argument is that the taxable income derived by the 
Taxpayer from the carrying on of his winemaking activities fall to be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act, but subject to the provisions of the First 
Schedule.293 In other words, the favourable concessions and other relevant provisions of 
the First Schedule may apply to such process, in spite of the fact that it also constitutes a 
process of manufacture. The discussion to follow will only briefly refer to the most 
relevant concessions which may be available to the Taxpayer in respect of his winemaking 
activities. A more detailed overview of the relevant legislative provisions has already been 
provided earlier in this study.294 
Firstly, it is submitted that the buildings used by the Taxpayer in his winemaking process 
(e.g. storerooms, cellars, bottling and packaging facilities) form part of his income-earning 
structure, and expenditure in the 'acquisition, expansion or improvement' of those assets is 
thus of a capital nature.295 Generally, such expenditure of a capital nature will not be 
deductible from income,296 and thus the Taxpayer will be greatly benefited ifhe can obtain 
the benefits of the First Schedule in this regard. In particular, the Taxpayer may seek to 
apply the provisions of paragraph 12(1)(f) of that Schedule to expenditure incurred by him 
on the erection of, or extensions, additions or improvements (other than repairs) to such 
buildings.297 
293 Section 26(1). 
294 Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
295 New State Areas Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 610; 14 SATC 155 at 163 - 164. The said assets clearly constitute 
part of the Taxpayer's 'means of production, i.e. the property plant, tools, etc., which he uses in the 
!:rformance of his income-earning operations.' 
Section II(a) read with section 23(g); Refer also to Stretch and Si/ke (note 71 above). 











The effect of paragraph 12(1)(1) will be that the Taxpayer should be entitled to a 100% 
deduction of the abovementioned types of expenditure incurred by him, but limited to his 
taxable income from farming operations. It is submitted that the abovementioned buildings 
are likely to be of a substantial cost to farmers such as the Taxpayer, and therefore the 
prospect of the said deduction should be highly advantageous from his point of view. 
However, it should be noted that certain recent amendments to the Act will have the effect 
that the Taxpayer will no longer be able to deduct such expenses in respect of buildings 
used for the housing of his employees.298 In spite of this setback, though, it is notable that 
there is still no provision in the Act which provides, in respect of buildings used in a 
'process of manufacture,' for a concession as beneficial as that contained in paragraph 
12(1 )(1).299 The latter point alone may be persuasive grounds for persons such as the 
Taxpayer to argue for the inclusion of his 'process of manufacture' within the ambit of his 
/ her 'farming operations.' The various further details of the interpretation and application 
of paragraph 12(1)(1) have been discussed in 2.3.3 above. 
The second most relevant concession applicable to the winemaking process of the 
Taxpayer, is that contained in section 12B(1)(I). Briefly, as discussed in 2.3.2 above, this 
concession allows a phased deduction over three years (Le. 50% in year one, 30% in year 
two and 20% in year three) of the cost of any machinery, implement, utensil or article 
(other than livestock) 'brought into use for the first time by (the) taxpayer and used by him 
or her in the carrying on of his or her farming operations.'30o Based on the argument above, 
the Taxpayer may thus seek to apply this concession to the specialised equipment (e.g. 
pumps, tanks and barrels) used by him in his winemaking process. 
Similarly to paragraph 12B(1 )(1), this very favourable concession does not have an equally 
beneficial counterpart that deals with similar equipment used in a 'process of 
manufacture.' While section 12C does provide for an accelerated depreciation allowance in 
respect of 'machinery or plant' owned or acquired by a taxpayer for use by him or by his 
lessee in a 'process of manufacture', this allowance is spread over four or five years 
298 Section 57 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 60 of2008; 2.3.3 above. 
299 The most similar concession to that contained in paragraph 12(l)(t), but applicable to manufacturing 
processes, is the annual allowance provided for in section 13; although this concession is not nearly as 
beneficial or extensive as that contained in paragraph 12(1)(t) (3.3 above). 












(depending on date of acquisition), and is thus not quite as favourable as the allowance 
under section 12B(1)(I), which applies specifically to fanning operations.30l 
The abovementioned tax concessions may be of most potential benefit to the Taxpayer in 
respect of his winemaking process, but there may be other concessions which can have 
favourable tax consequences in his case (the most relevant of which were referred to in 2.3 
above). It should be noted, fmally, that the application of any concessions on the strength 
of an argument such as that formulated in 6.3 above, is highly dependent on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular taxpayer. 











7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study sought to argue, ftrstly, that taxpayers who earn income from carrying on 
farming operations have access to more favourable tax concessions than those who earn 
income from processes of manufacture (chapters 2 - 3 above). The most relevant 
concessions applicable to these respective industries or trades were discussed, and those of 
lesser signiftcance were referred to. 
In chapter 4, a question foundational to the main focus of this study was discussed, 
namely: 'Where do 'farming operations' end and other trades or activities begin?' In the 
context of the available jurisprudence, this question was phrased more speciftcally as: 'Is it 
possible for activities which may not, in ordinary parlance, constitute 'farming operations', 
to be included within the ambit of that phrase, and if so, under what circumstances?' It was 
shown, with reference to judicial commentaries and the literature, that the latter, more 
speciftc question has been the subject of some consideration. The conclusion, based on the 
aforementioned authority, was that certain so-called 'post-farming' activities may indeed 
be included within the phrase 'farming operations.' Certain general guidelines were 
identifted, the relevance of which was emphasised with reference to judicial application in 
subsequent cases. 
Ultimately, chapter 5 introduced the main aim of this study, namely to discuss the 
occurrence of taxpayers who carry on 'farming operations' and 'processes of manufacture' 
simultaneously. The relevance of this particular focus was explained in light of the modem 
trend toward such a co vergence of activities, followed by a discussion of relevant case 
law, applicable commentaries and ftscal legislation. The relevant guidelines already 
referred to were applied, and further guidelines on this speciftc focus area were introduced. 
Chapter 6, in conclusion, sought to illustrate the possible application of the relevant 
guidelines. In particular, this chapter argued that favourable tax planning opportunities 
may arise for taxpayers who carry on the distinct trades of farming and manufacturing 
simultaneously. A hypothetical scenario was accordingly set out and a suggested argument 
formulated in the context of the postulated facts, with the aid of the relevant principles and 
guidelines. Thereafter, on the supposition that such argument would be successful, a brief 
discussion followed which sought to highlight the most relevant concessions which the 











In conclusion it is submitted that the guidelines referred to in this study (whilst not 
purporting to be exhaustive) may be fruitfully applied, for tax planning purposes, by 
taxpayers who carry on farming operations and manufacturing processes simultaneously. 
However, it should be emphasised that the taxpayer's particular factual circumstances and 
all relevant factors should be closely considered, in light of the said guidelines. 
While the formulation of an exhaustive list of principles applicable to all scenarios is not 
considered viable, this study discussed some of the relevant issues, principles and 
opportunities which may be of assistance to taxpayers such as those considered herein. 
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